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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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TAB C: COVERT ACTION
TAB D: CUBA
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# SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE - ASSASSINATION REPORT

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taken during the Bay of Pigs operation) present Castro with a contaminated diving suit* (Colby, 5/21, pp. 38-39).

The Inspector General's Report dates this operation in January 1963, when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as Chief of Task Force W, although it is unclear whether Harvey or Fitzgerald conceived of the plan (I.G., p. 75). It is likely that the activity took place earlier, since Donovan had completed his negotiations by the middle of January 1963. Helms characterized the plan as "cockeyed" (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).

TSD bought a diving suit, dusted the inside with a fungus that would produce a chronic skin disease (Madura foot), and contaminated the breathing apparatus with a tubercule bacillus (I.G., p. 75). The Inspector General's Report states that the plan was abandoned because Donovan gave Castro a different diving suit on his own initiative (I.G., p. 75). Helms testified that the diving suit never left the laboratory (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).

(e) AMLASH

(1) Origin of the Project

In March 1961, an officer of the Mexico City CIA station met with a highly-placed Cuban official to determine if he would cooperate in efforts against the Castro regime (I.G., p. 78). The Cuban, referred to by the cryptonym AMLASH-1, had been

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*Donovan was not aware of the plan.

TOP SECRET

A CIA cable dated February 2, 1965, stated that B-1 had given AMLASH-1 a silencer and that AMLASH-1 had "small, highly concentrated explosives." On February 11, 1965 the 5-2 [redacted] Station cabled that AMLASH-1 would soon receive "one pistol with silencer and one FAL rifle with a silencer from B-1's secretary" (I.G., p. 103). A subsequent cable reported that "B-1 had three packages of special items made up by his technical people and delivered to AMLASH-1 [in Madrid"] (I.G., p. 103

In June 1965, CIA terminated all contact with AMLASH-1 and his associates because of reports that his activities were widely known (I.G., pp. 104-105).

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"4. B-1 is to be in Cuba one week before the elimination of Fidel, but no one, including AM/LASH-1 will know B-1's location.

"5. B-1 is to arrange for recongition by at least five Latin American countries as soon as Fidel is neutralized and a junta is formed. This junta will be established even though Raul Castro and Che Guevara may still be alive and may still be in control of the part of the country. This is the reason AM/LASH-1 requested that B-1 be able to establish some control over one of the provinces so that the junta can be formed in that location.

"6. One month to the day before the neutralization of Fidel, B-1 will increase the number of commando attacks to a maximum in order to raise the spirit and morale of the people inside Cuba. In all communiques, in all radio messages, in all propaganda put out by B-1 he must relate that the raid was possible thanks to the information received from clandestine sources inside Cuba and from the clandestine underground apparatus directed by "P". This will be AM/LASH-1's war name."

Agreed to by Subcommittee 10/10/75
Pending (1) Rewrite per Subcommittee
Editing and (2) Insertion of
Gottlieb and Tweedy Testimony

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DRAFT: OCTOBER 6, 1975
Frederick D. Baron

TOP SECRET
For Internal Committee Use Only

## D. CONGO

### 1. Introduction

The Committee has received solid evidence of a CIA plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. The plot proceeded to the point where lethal substances and instruments specifically intended for use in an assassination were placed in the hands of the CIA [Chief of] Station in Leopoldville by an Agency scientist.

Although these instruments of assassination were never used, a number of questions are presented by the Lumumba case which reflect general issues that run throughout the Committee's assassination inquiry. First, did CIA officers and operatives in the Congo take steps to attempt the assassination of Lumumba?

Second, how high in the United States government was the source of authorization for the CIA assassination plot? Finally, was the CIA connected in any way to the events that actually led to the death of Lumumba while in Congolese custody?

A thread of historical background is necessary to weave these broad questions together with the documents and testimony received by the Committee.

Stanleyville, and he was imprisoned. The central government of the Congo transferred Lumumba on January 17, 1961 to the custody of authorities in the province of Katanga, which was asserting its own independence at that time. Several weeks later, the Katangese authorities announced Lumumba's death.

There are various accounts of the circumstances and timing of Lumumba's death. The United Nations investigation of the incident concluded that Lumumba was killed on January 17.*

2. Dulles Cables Leopoldville That "Removal" of Lumumba is an Urgent Objective in "High Quarters"

Shortly after the Congolese declaration of independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960, the CIA assigned a new [Chief of] Station to the Congo. The [Chief of] Station said that the briefings he received at CIA headquarters in preparation for his departure contained no discussion of the possibility of assassinating Patrice Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 8). On his brief return to headquarters in connection with Lumumba's visit to Washington in late July, the [Chief of] Station again heard no discussion of assassinating Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 9).

During August, great concern about Lumumba's political strength in the Congo was growing among the foreign policy-makers of the Eisenhower Administration.** This concern was nurtured

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* Report of the Commission of Investigation, 11/61, UN Security Council, Official Records, Supplement for October, November, and December.

** See Section 5, infra, for full discussion of the prevailing anti-Lumumba attitude in the United States government as shown by minutes of the National Security Council and Special Group and the testimony of high Administration officials.

by intelligence reports such as that cabled to CIA headquarters by the new Chief of Station:

> EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING CLASSIC COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT. MANY FORCES AT WORK HERE: SOVIETS ... COMMUNIST PARTY, ETC. ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT DETERMINE MAJOR INFLUENCING FACTORS TO PREDICT OUTCOME STRUGGLE FOR POWER, DECISIVE PERIOD NOT FAR OFF. WHETHER OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST PLAYING COMMIE GAME TO ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI-WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND THERE MAY BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TAKE ACTION TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA.... (CIA Cable (IN 39706), Leopoldville to Director, 8/18/60.)

This cable also stated the Chief of Station's operational "OBJECTIVE [OF] REPLACING LUMUMBA WITH PRO WESTERN GROUP" (CIA Cable, 8/18/60). Bronson Tweedy, then Chief of the Africa Division of CIA's clandestine services, replied the same day that he was seeking State Department approval for the proposed operation based upon "OUR BELIEF LUMUMBA MUST BE REMOVED IF POSSIBLE" (CIA Cable (Out 59741), Tweedy to Leopoldville, 8/18/60). On August 19, Richard Bissell, Director of CIA's covert operations branch, signed a follow-up cable to Leopoldville: "YOU ARE AUTHORIZED PROCEED WITH OPERATION" (CIA Cable OUT 59959, Director to Leopoldville, 8/19/60).

Several days later, the Chief of Station reported that a plan to assassinate Lumumba had been proposed to President Kasavubu by Congolese leaders:

> ANTI-LUMUMBA LEADERS APPROACHED KASAVUBU WITH PLAN ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA ... KASAVUBU REFUSED AGREE SAYING HE RELUCTANT RESORT VIOLENCE AND NO OTHER LEADER SUFFICIENT STATURE REPLACE LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable (IN 42761), Leopoldville to Director, 8/24/60.)

The next day, Allen Dulles personally signed a cable* to the Leopoldville Chief of Station which stressed the urgency of "removing" Lumumba:

> IN HIGH QUARTERS** HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL [LUMUMBA] CONTINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITABLE RESULT WILL AT BEST BE CHAOS AND AT WORST PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PRESTIGE OF THE UN AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY. CONSEQUENTLY WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE THAT UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION. (CIA Cable, OUT 62966, Director to Leopoldville, 8/26/60.)

Dulles cabled that the Chief of Station was to be given "WIDER AUTHORITY" -- along the lines of the previously authorized operation to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western group -- "INCLUDING EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). "WE REALIZE THAT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY MAY PRESENT THEMSELVES TO YOU," the cable continued (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).

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* Cables issued under the personal signature of the DCI are a relative rarity in CIA communitations and call attention to the importance and sensitivity of the matter discussed.

** As discussed in Section 5(c), <u>infra</u>, Richard Bisell testified that Allen Dulles would have used the phrase "higher quarters" to refer to the President (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48).

Dulles also authorized the expenditure of up to $100,000 "TO CARRY OUT ANY CRASH PROGRAMS ON WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT HQS" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). He assured the Chief of Station that the message had been "SEEN AND APPROVED AT COMPETENT LEVEL" in the State Department (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). But the Director of Central Intelligence made a special point of assuring the Chief of Station that he was authorized to act unilaterally in a case where the United States Ambassador to the Congo would prefer to remain uninformed:

> TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRE TO BE CONSULTED, YOU SHOULD SEEK HIS CONCURRENCE. IF IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE, HE DOES NOT WISH TO BE CONSULTED YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).

This mandate raises a question as to whether the DCI was contemplating a particular form of action against Lumumba which the Ambassador would want to be in a position to "plausibly deny" United States involvement. DDP Richard Bissell testified that he was "almost certain" that he was informed about the Dulles cable shortly after its transmission and that it was his "belief" that the cable was a circumlocutious means of indicating that the President wanted Lumumba to be killed (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33, 64-65).*

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* See Section 5(c), infra, for additional testimony by Bissell on the question of authorization for the assassination effort against Lumumba.

to a remark by the Chief of Station that implied that he might assassinate Lumumba:

> TO COS COMMENT THAT LUMUMBA IN OPPOSITION IS ALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS IN OFFICE, [THE CONGOLESE POLITICIAN] INDICATED UNDERSTOOD AND IMPLIED MIGHT PHYSICALLY ELIMINATE LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, (IN 49679,) Leopoldville to Director, 9/7/60.)

The cable continued to report that the Chief of Station had offered to assist this politician "IN PREPARATION NEW GOVERNMENT PROGRAM" and assured him that the United States would supply technicians (CIA Cable, 9/7/60).

As the chaotic struggle for power raged, the Chief of the Africa Division succinctly summarized the prevalent U. S. apprehension about Lumumba's ability to influence events in the Congo by virtue of personality, irrespective of his official position:

> LUMUMBA TALENTS AND DYNAMISM APPEAR OVERRIDING FACTOR IN REESTABLISHING HIS POSITION EACH TIME IT SEEMS HALF LOST. IN OTHER WORDS EACH TIME LUMUMBA HAS OPPORTUNITY HAVE LAST WORD HE CAN SWAY EVENTS TO HIS ADVANTAGE. (CIA Cable, (OUT 69233,) Director to Leopoldville, 9/13/60).

The day after Mobutu's coup, the Chief of Station reported that he was serving as an advisor to a Congolese effort to "eliminate" Lumumba due to his "fear" that Lumumba might, in fact, have been strengthened by placing himself in UN custody, which afforded a safe base of operations:

> STILL DIFFICULT DETERMINE WHETHER MOBUTU HAS SUFFICIENT CONTROL ARMY TO ENFORCE DECISIONS ANNOUNCED NIGHT 14 SEPTEMBER. STATION ADVISED [TWO MODERATE CONGOLESE POLITICIANS] TRY WORK WITH [KEY CONGOLESE CONTACT] IN EFFORT ELIMINATE LUMUMBA. FEAR UN PROTECTION WILL GIVE LUMUMBA OPPORTUNITY ORGANIZE COUNTER ATTACK. ONLY SOLUTION IS REMOVE HIM FROM SCENE SOONEST. (CIA Cable, (IN 13374,) Leopoldville to Director, 9/15/60.)

On September 17, another CIA operative in the Congo met with a leading Congolese senator. At this meeting, the senator requested a clandestine supply of small arms to equip some Congolese Army troops. The cable to CIA headquarters concerning the meeting reported:

> [CONGOLESE SENATOR] REQUESTED CLANDESTINE SUPPLY SMALL ARMS TO EQUIP ... TROOPS RECENTLY ARRIVED LEOP[OLDVILLE] AREA ... [THE SENATOR] SAYS THIS WOULD PROVIDE CORE ARMED MEN WILLING AND ABLE TAKE DIRECT ACTION ... [SENATOR] RELUCTANTLY AGREES LUMUMBA MUST GO PERMANENTLY. DISTRUSTS [ANOTHER CONGOLESE LEADER] BUT WILLING MAKE PEACE WITH HIM FOR PURPOSES ELIMINATION LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, (IN 14228,) Leopoldville to Director, 9/17/60.)

The CIA operative told the Congolese senator that "HE WOULD EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OBTAINING ARMS" and recommended to CIA headquarters that they should

> HAVE [ARMS] SUPPLIES READY TO GO AT NEAREST BASE PENDING [UNITED STATES] DECISION THAT SUPPLY WARRANTED AND NECESSARY (CIA Cable, 9/17/60).*

---

* This recommendation proved to be in line with large scale planning at CIA headquarters for clandestine paramilitary support to anti-Lumumba elements. On October 6, 1960, Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy signed a cable concerning plans which the Chief of Station was instructed not to discuss with State Department representatives or operational contacts:
(footnote continued on next page)

Several days later, while warning a key Congolese leader about coup plots led by Lumumba and two of his supporters, the Chief of Station

> URGED ARREST OR OTHER MORE PERMANENT DISPOSAL OF LUMUMBA, GIZENGA, AND MULELE (CIA Cable, (IN 15643,) Leopoldville to Director, 9/20/61).

Gizenga and Mulele were Lumumba's lieutenants who were leading his supporters while Lumumba was in UN custody.

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(Footnote continued from previous page)

> [IN]VIEW UNCERTAIN OUTCOME CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS [CIA] CONDUCTING CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CONGO AT REQUEST POLICY ECHELONS. THIS PLANNING DESIGNED TO PREPARE FOR SITUATION IN WAY [UNITED STATES] WOULD PROVIDE CLANDESTINE SUPPORT TO ELEMENTS IN ARMED OPPOSITION TO LUMUMBA.
>
> CONTEMPLATED ACTION INCLUDES PROVISION ARMS, SUPPLIES AND PERHAPS SOME TRAINING TO ANTI-LUMUMBA RESISTANCE GROUPS.
>
> (CIA Cable (OUT 04697,) Director to Leopoldville, 10/6/60.)

4. The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba

In the fall of 1960, a scientist from CIA headquarters delivered to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville lethal biological substances to be used to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. The Chief of Station testified that after requesting and receiving confirmation from CIA headquarters that he was to carry out the scientist's instructions, he proceeded to take "exploratory steps" in furtherance of the assassination plot. The Chief of Station testified that in the course of his discussion with the CIA scientist, Sidney Gottlieb, he was informed that President Eisenhower had ordered the assassination mission against Patrice Lumumba. Gottlieb's mission to the Congo was both preceded and followed by general cables urging the "elimination" of Lumumba sent from CIA headquarters in an extraordinarily restricted "Eyes Only" channel -- including two messages under the personal signature of Allen Dulles.

The lethal substances were never used by the Chief of Station. But despite the fact that Lumumba had placed himself in the protective custody of the UN peace-keeping force shortly before the poisons were delivered to the Chief of Station, there is no clear evidence that the assassination operation was terminated before Lumumba's death. There is, however, no direct evidence of a connection between the CIA assassination plot and the events which actually led to Lumumba's death.*

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* See Section 6, infra, for a discussion of the evidence about the circumstances that led to Lumumba's death in Katanga.

(a) Dulles Cables Again for "Elimination" of Lumumba, and a Messenger is Sent to Congo With a Highly Sensitive Assignment

On September 19, 1960, several days after Lumumba placed himself in the protective custody of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Leopoldville, Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy signed a cryptic cable to Leopoldville to arrange a clandestine meeting between the Chief of Station and "Sidney Braun," who was traveling to the Congo on an unspecified assignment:

> ["SID"] SHOULD ARRIVE APPROX 27 SEPT. . . WILL ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS "SID FROM PARIS". . . IT URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE ["SID"] SOONEST POSSIBLE AFTER HE PHONES YOU. HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFY HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS ASSIGNMENT TO YOU. (CIA Cable, OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief of Station, 9/19/60.)

The cable bore a highly unusual sensitivity indicator -- "PROP" -- that restricted circulation at CIA headquarters to the Chief of the Africa Division.*

---

* In a letter of September 23, 1975, the Chief of the CIA Review Staff informed the Committee that "PROP" was normally used "to denote sensitive personnel matters" (Seymour R. Bolton to Frederick A. O. Schwarz and Frederick D. Baron, 9/23/75. It appears that this sensitivity indicator, while created for other purposes, was utilized by Bissell, Tweedy, and the Chief of Station to restrict distribution of their communications about an assassination operation. The cable traffic cited in this report that was sent through the PROP channel did not touch upon personnel matters except in terms of recruiting additional CIA officers and agents for the assassination operation.

The Bissell/Tweedy cable informed the (Chief of) Station that he was to continue to use this indicator for

> ALL [CABLE] TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOU INSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO YOURSELF. (CIA Cable, 9/19/60.)

The (Chief of) Station -- referred to herein as "Hedgman"* -- testified to a clear, independent recollection of receiving such a cable. Hedgman stated that in September of 1960 he received a "most unusual" cable from CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 11, 43). The cable advised, in his words, that:

> someone who I would have recognized would arrive with instructions for me.... I believe the message was also marked for my eyes only ... and contained instructions that I was not to discuss the message with anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 12-13.)

Hedgman said that the cable did not specify the kind of instructions he was to receive, and it "did not refer to Lumumba in any way" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 12).

Three days after the Bissell/Tweedy message that Hedgman was to meet "Sid" in Leopoldville, Bronson Tweedy uses the same sensitivity indicator on a cable sent to Hedgman on an "Eyes Only" basis (CIA Cable, (OUT 74837,) Tweedy to Leopoldville, 9/22/60).

---

* Due to fear of reprisal from Lumumba's followers, the (Chief of) Station for the Congo from mid-summer 1960 through 1961 testified under the alias "Hedgman" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 2; 8/25/75, p. 4).

Tweedy's cable indicated that a third country national would be required as an agent in the PROP operation:

> IF DECIDED SUPPORT FOR PROP OBJECTIVES, BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SUCH BE PROVIDED THROUGH THIRD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH [AMERICAN] ROLE COMPLETELY CONCEALED. (CIA Cable, 9/22/60.)

Tweedy expressed reservations about two agents that the station was using for other operations and said "WE ARE CONSIDERING A THIRD NATIONAL CUTOUT CONTACT CANDIDATE AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT FILL BILL"* (CIA Cable, 9/22/60). Despite Tweedy's concern about the two existing station contacts, he indicated that the Chief of station and his "colleague" -- presumably the man identified as "Sid" who was to arrive in the Congo shortly to explain the PROP operation to Hedgman -- were to be afforded considerable latitude in exercising their judgment on the conduct of the operation:

> YOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANNOT READ OVER YOUR SHOULDER AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESS OPPORTUNITIES. OUR PRIMARY CONCERN MUST BE CONCEALMENT [AMERICAN] ROLE, UNLESS OUTSTANDING OPPORTUNITY EMERGES WHICH MAKES CALCULATED RISK FIRST CLASS BET. READY ENTERTAIN ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS YOU MAKE BASED OUR HIGH REGARD BOTH YOUR PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENTS. (CIA Cable, 9/22/60.)

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* This is probably a reference to agent QJWIN, who was later dispatched to the Congo. His mission is discussed in Sections ____, ____, and ____, *infra*.

On September 24, Allen Dulles personally issued a cable to Leopoldville expressing in absolute terms his desire to "eliminate" Lumumba:

> WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP[OLDVILLE], SETTING HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable, OUT 73573), Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)

Dulles had expressed a similar view three days before in the presence of the President at an NSC meeting, stating:

> Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of. (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60)

(b) <u>Gottlieb Delivers Lethal Substances to the Chief of Station in the Congo for the Assassination of Lumumba</u>

The Chief of Station reported through the PROP channel to Bronson Tweedy that he had made contact with the man dispatched to Leopoldville with a highly sensitive assignment on September 26. (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 9/27/60) This was the same week in which Dulles cabled about the "elimination" of Lumumba and made his statement to the NSC about the "grave danger" that existed as long as Lumumba was not "disposed of".

Hedgman testified about the identity of "SID" -- the messenger referred to in the first cable through the PROP channel:

> <u>Q:</u> Who was the messenger who arrived?
>
> <u>Hedgman</u>: Mr. Sidney Gottlieb

Q: And at that time, you knew who he was?

Hedgman: I recognized him as an officer of the Agency . . . . I believe he referred to the fact that I had received a message and that he was the person concerned. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 15-16)

The message carried by (Gottlieb, then Science Advisor to DDP Richard Bissell,) was unmistakeably clear according to Hedgman:

Hedgman: It is my recollection that he advised me, or my instructions were, to eliminate Lumumba.

Q: By eliminate, do you mean assassinate?

Hedgman: Yes. I would say that was . . . my understanding of the primary means. I don't think it was probably limited to that, if there was some other way of doing it.

Q: Of doing what?

Hedgman: Of removing him from a position of political threat. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 17-18.)

Hedgman said that he and (Gottlieb) also may have discussed non-lethal means of removing Lumumba as a "political threat", but he said, "I cannot recall with certainty on that" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 28).

He clearly recalled the discussion of assassination, however:

Q: And what did Mr. (Gottlieb) indicate with regard to the possibility of physically eliminating him?

Hedgman: It was my understanding that that was probably expected of me. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 18.)

And again:

Q: I take it that once you started discussing these lethal agents, there was no doubt in your mind that the kind of elimination he was there particularly to discuss was killing Lumumba?

Hedgman: There was no doubt in my mind that this was one of the way[s], and probably what they thought was the only way that would work (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 25).

Hedgman explained Gottlieb provided him with poisons as a means of assassination:

Q: And what did he tell you with regard to how that might be accomplished?

Hedgman: ... He brought some biological agents. I assume that that's the correct word. But in any case, poisonous agent with him, which he passed to me....

Q: These were lethal biological substances?

Hedgman: Yes. That was my understanding as a non-expert. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 18-19.)

Hedgman testified that he received "rubber gloves, a mask, and a syringe" along with the poisons and that Gottlieb instructed him in their use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 20-21). Hedgman indicated that this paraphernalia was for administering the poisons to Lumumba:

Q: [W]hen he [Gottlieb] came to the Congo to give you lethal biological agents for the assassination of Lumumba, was it clear at that time that the means for administering those biological agents was to inject them into a substance that was to be ingested by Lumumba, whether it be food, or drink, or toothpaste or any other substance that was to be ingested?

Hedgman: That's my recollection, yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 82; accord. p. 24.)

Hedgman said that the means of assassination was not restricted to use of the poisons provided by Gottlieb:

This was not a sine qua non that I employ this. If there were another method, another way, it would have been acceptable. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)

For example, Hedgman testified that he may have "suggested" shooting Lumumba to Gottlieb as an alternative to poisoning (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29).

There was a firm requirement, however, that the means of assassination should not be traceable to the United States:

> The biological substance, or specimens, what have you, I think it was up to my judgment, and if there was a better way -- certainly. [T]he point I now recall was in no way, if I implemented these instructions, no way could it be traced back to the United States. It had to be a way which could not be traced back ... either to an American or the United States government. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)

Hedgman said Gottlieb assured him that the poisons were produced to meet this requirement:

> I believe I raised the point that poisons left traces in the human body, which could be found on autopsy ... I believe that I was assured that these ... lethal agents would [leave] normal traces found in people that die of certain diseases. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 23.)

Hedgman said that he had an "emotional reaction of great surprise" when it first became clear that Gottlieb was there to discuss an assassination plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 30). But the Chief of Station said that he did not give any indication that he would not carry out the instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46). Instead, he told Gottlieb he "would explore this" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46) and left him with the following impression:

> I think it would be a fair impression that he would take away the thought that I was going to look into it and try and figure if there was a way ... I believe I

> stressed the difficulty of trying to carry out such an operation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 47.)

The cable that Hedgman sent to headquarters reporting his initial contact with (Gottlieb) was clearly an affirmative response to the assignment. The (Chief of) Station said that he and (Gottlieb) were "ON SAME WAVELENGTH." (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 9/27/60.) Hedgman was "afraid" that [Mobutu's] government was "weakening under" foreign pressure to effect a reconciliation with Lumumba, and said:

> HENCE BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY INDICATED. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)

(c) Hedgman Testified That (Gottlieb) Told Him That President Eisenhower Had Ordered the Assassination of Lumumba

Hedgman testified that in the course of their meeting in Leopoldville, (Dr. Gottlieb) informed him that President Eisenhower had authorized the assassination of Lumumba:

> Q: Did you raise with him the question of authorization of such instructions to you?
>
> Hedgman: Yes, I did. That's my quite strong recollection, that I did.
>
> Q: What do you recall in essence was what you said to him?
>
> Hedgman: In essence, I think I must have ... pointed out that this was not a common or usual Agency tactic, and I may have probably said that I never heard of it being done, which I had not, never in my training or previous work in the Agency had I ever heard any references to such, in my recollection at least, such methods. And it is my recollection I asked on whose authority these instructions were issued.
>
> Q: And what did Mr. (Gottlieb) reply?

Hedgman cautioned that he was recalling events long past:

> Hedgman: Gentlemen, after fifteen years, I cannot be 100 per cent certain, but I have always, since that date, had the impression in my mind that these orders had come from the President. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 34.)

But he left no doubt about the strength of his "impression":

> Q: You have a very firm recollection that he [Gottlieb] represented to you that the President of the United States directed the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, is that correct?
>
> Hedgman: That's my recollection. Yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 102; accord, p. 34.)

(d) Headquarters Makes the Assassination Plot "Highest Priority" and Authorizes Steps in Furtherance of It

On the basis of his talks with "Sid," Hedgman listed a number of "possibilities" for covert action against Lumumba. At the top of the list was the suggestion that a particular agent be used in the following manner:

> HAVE HIM TAKE REFUGE WITH BIG BROTHER. WOULD THUS ACT AS INSIDE MAN TO BRUSH UP DETAILS TO RAZOR EDGE. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)

Hedgman indicated that he would begin to follow this course by recalling the agent to Leopoldville. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.) He informed headquarters: "PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS LISTED ABOVE, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY" (CIA Cable, 9/27/60).

On September 30, the Chief of Station urged that headquarters authorize "exploratory conversations" with this agent so

The same day, through the PROP channel, Hedgman received authorization from headquarters to proceed with his top priority plan:

> YOU ARE AUTHORIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH [redacted] TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUTOUT ROLE. ... APPRECIATE MANNER YOUR APPROACH TO PROBLEM. (CIA Cable, OUT 75900, Fields to Leopoldville, 9/30/60.)

In this cable, Glenn Fields, Assistant Chief of the Africa Division, expressed a "HOPE ... FOR MODERATE HASTE" (CIA Cable OUT 75900, Fields to Leopoldville, 9/30/60.)

According to the report of the Chief of Station, Gottlieb left the Congo to return to headquarters on October 5 in view of the "EXPIRATION DATE HIS MATERIALS" (CIA Cable IN 24171, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60). The "expiration" of Gottlieb's "materials" probably refers to the date beyond which the substances would no longer have lethal strength. Although the relation of the "expiration date" to Gottlieb's departure is unclear from the cables, it probably signifies that some of the biological substances had lost their toxicity. Nonetheless, the Chief of Station indicated that Gottlieb left some biological substances that were still lethal and that he intended to proceed with the assassination operation:

> [SID] LEFT CERTAIN ITEMS OF CONTINUING USEFULNESS. [CHIEF OF STATION] PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP. (CIA Cable IN 24171, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.)

By this point, Hedgman had conducted his "exploratory conversation" with the agent who was his best candidate for gaining access to Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 60). Hedgman testified that the subject he "explored" was the agent's ability to find a means to inject poison into Lumumba's food or toothpaste (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 60):

> I believe that I queried the agent who had access to Lumumba, and his entourage, in detail about just what that access, what access he actually had, as opposed to speaking to people. In other words, did he have access to the bathroom, did he have access to the kitchen, things of that sort.
>
> I have a recollection of having queried him on that without specifying why I wanted to know this. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 48.)

On October 7, the Chief of Station reported to headquarters on this meeting:

> CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION WITH [AGENT] ... AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES [AGENT] SUGGESTED SOLUTION RECOMMENDED BY HQS. ALTHOUGH DID NOT PICK UP BALL, BELIEVE HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY WITHIN LIMITS SECURITY ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE.

Hedgman testified that his exploratory steps left him with doubts about the wisdom or practicality of the assassination plot:

> [C]ertainly I looked on it as a pretty wild scheme professionally. I did not think that it ... was practical professionally. Certainly ... to keep the U.S. out of it....
>
> I explored it, but I doubt that I ever really expected to carry it out. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 111.)

However, his cables indicate that he was planning to continue to implement the operation and sought the resources to do it successfully. He urged headquarters to send him an alternate operative for the assassination mission in the event that they found his first choice unacceptable:

> IF HQS BELIEVE [AGENT'S CIRCUMSTANCES] BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WISH STRESS NECESSITY PROVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL. (CIA Cable IN 24171, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.)

Tweedy cabled the Chief of Station the same day that he "HAD GOOD DISCUSSION YOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT" -- presumably referring to a de-briefing of Gottlieb upon his return to the United States. (CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 10/7/60.) Tweedy indicated that he was

> CONSIDERING DISPATCHING THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL OPERATOR WHO, WHEN HE ARRIVES, SHOULD THEN BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVER PERIOD TO SEE WHETHER HE MIGHT PLAY ACTIVE OR CUTOUT ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS. (CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60.)

This expression of support for the operation was followed by an extraordinary pair of cables from headquarters on October 15, 1960. One of these cables was issued by a desk officer in CIA's Africa Division and released under Bronson Tweedy's signature, as Division Chief, and sent to Leopoldville through standard CIA channels, which would allow for distribution of the message to

appropriate personnel in the CIA station and the United States embassy. This cable ... generally discussed the possibility of covertly supplying certain Congolese leaders with funds and military aid (CIA Cable OUT 81476, Director to Leopoldville, 10/15/60). This cable also delimited the kind of action against Lumumba that would be authorized:

> ONLY DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NOW STAND BEHIND IS TO SUPPORT IMMOBILIZING OR ARRESTING [LUMUMBA], DESIRABLE AS MORE DEFINITIVE ACTION MIGHT BE. ANY ACTION TAKEN WOULD HAVE TO BE ENTIRELY CONGOLESE. (CIA Cable OUT 81476, Director to Leopoldville, 10/15/60.)

On the same day that this message was dispatched, a second cable was sent to Leopoldville. This cable was issued personally by Bronson Tweedy and sent in the special PROP channel for Hedgman's "EYES ONLY" (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60).

> YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROUGH NORMAL CHANNEL CURRENTLY BEING TRANSMITTED A PARA[GRAPH] ON PROP TYPE SUGGESTIONS. YOU WILL PROBABLY RECEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBLING BLOC [LUMUMBA] REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALL STUDYING CONGO SITUATION CLOSELY AND HIS DISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CONSIDERATION.
>
> RAISE ABOVE SO YOU NOT CONFUSED BY ANY APPARENT DUPLICATION. THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY. (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60).

Thus, Tweedy resolved the apparent duplication of cables by indicating that communications about the assassination mission were

restricted to the PROP channel and that the assassination mission was to move forward. He went on to request Hedgman's reaction to the prospect of sending a senior CIA case officer to the Congo on a "DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT ... TO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY THIS ASPECT" (CIA Cable (OUT 81396), Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/15/60). This referred to CIA officer [Justin O'Donnell] who testified that in late October he was asked by Richard Bissell to undertake the mission of assassinating Lumumba.*

In the course of suggesting the assignment of an additional officer to the Congo, the cable provided insight into the reason that the assassination mission had not progressed more rapidly under the (Chief of) Station:

> SEEMS TO US YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS TOO HEAVY GIVE NECESSARY CONCENTRATION PROP. (CIA Cable (OUT 81396), Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/15/60.)

Again, in contradiction of the limitations on anti-Lumumba activity outlined in the cable sent through normal channels, Tweedy's cable also proposed a plan to kidnap Lumumba:

> POSSIBILITY USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR ABDUCTION [LUMUMBA], EITHER VIA ASSAULT ON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR, MORE PROBABLY, IF [LUMUMBA] ATTEMPTS ANOTHER BREAKOUT INTO TOWN ... REQUEST YOUR VIEWS. (CIA Cable (OUT 81396), Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/15/60.)

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* For a full account of the meeting between Bissell and (O'Donnell and O'Donnell's) subsequent activities in the Congo, see Section 5(a), *infra*.

This series of cables sent during, and after Gottlieb's visit to the Congo demonstrated a clear intent at CIA headquarters to authorize and support rapid progress on the assassination mission. The cables also show an intent to severely restrict knowledge of the assassination operation among officers in CIA's Africa Division and among United States personnel in the Congo, including those who were aware of and involved in other covert activities.

(e) <u>The Chief of Station Moves Forward With Assassination Plot</u>

The testimony of the Chief of Station, taken fifteen years after the events in question and without benefit of review of the cables discussed above, was compatible with the picture derived from the cables of a fully authorized and tightly restricted assassination operation. Hedgman's testimony is at variance from the cables only with respect to the lack of vigor with which he claims to have pursued the assignment which he dealt with in an affirmative, aggressive manner in the cables.

(i) <u>The Chief of Station Testified That He Requested and Received Confirmation of the Assassination Plan from Headquarters</u>

Hedgman testified that, after receiving Gottlieb's instructions, he cabled CIA headquarters seeking confirmation that he was to carry out Gottlieb's instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 36). Hedgman did not recall whether he identified Gottlieb by name, and he doubted that he "would have" mentioned the President in such a cable (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 36, 43).

Hedgman described the extraordinary security precautions he took cabling his request for confirmation of the assassination instructions:

> There was some special channel ... because it was handled differently than any other normal message. For example, it was not put on a regular cable form, which, you know, you have several copies for your various files. And it was my recollection that I personally carried the message to the communicator to encrypt, and that was worded in a doublt-talk way that even the communicator would not necessarily know what it was about." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 42-43.)

This description approximates the PROP channel that was used for all cables relating to the assassination mission.

Hedgman testified that soon after cabling his request for confirmation that he was to carry out the assassination assignment, he received an affirmative reply from headquarters:

> I believe I received a reply which I interpreted to mean yes, that he was the messenger and his instructions were ... duly authorized. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 37-38.)

Despite the cryptic nature of the cables, Hedgman said "I was convinced that yes, it was right." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 44, 50.)

Hedgman did not recall receiving any indication, either from Gottlieb or by cable, that he was to await further authorization before using the poisons (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 38). Hedgman expressed some uncertainty about whether he "had an absolute free hand" to proceed with an assassination attempt without receiving "final confirmation" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 38, 47, 53).

Hedgman summarized his testimony on this question in his second appearance:

> I probably had authority to act on my own but ... it was possible that I had to go back and get clearance for my action. (Hedgman, 8/25/75, p. 11; <u>see also</u> 8/21/75, p. 39.)

Hedgman testified, however, that a "policy decision" had been made -- that assassination had been "approved" as "one means" of eliminating Lumumba as a political threat (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52).

> I thought the policy decision had been made in the White House, not in the Agency, and that the Agency had been selected as the Executive Agent, if you will, to carry out a political decision. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52.)

Although Hedgman assumed that the President had not personally selected the means of assassination, he testified that he was under the impression that the President had authorized the CIA to do so and to proceed to take action:

> <u>Hedgman</u>: ... I doubt that I thought the President had said, you use this system. But my understanding is the President had made a decision that an act should take place, but then put that into the hands of the Agency to carry out his decision.
>
> <u>Q</u>: Whatever that act was to be, it was clearly to be assassination or the death of the foreign political leader?
>
> <u>Hedgman</u>: Yes.
>
> <u>Q</u>: Instigated by the CIA, initiated by the CIA?
>
> <u>Hedgman</u>: Certainly if those -- if Dr. Gottlieb's lethal agents were employed, that would have been the result, yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 104.)

Nonetheless, Hedgman said he had no "desire to carry out these instructions" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 106). Whether or not he felt there was authority to attempt an assassination without seeking final confirmation, he said that he would have checked with headquarters before taking action:

> I think probably that I would have gone back and advised that I intended to carry out and sought final approval before carrying it out had I been going to do it, had there been a way to do it. I did not see it as ... a matter which could be accomplished practically, certainly. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 51-52.)

He proceeded to affirm that his reason for seeking a final approval would have been to receive assurances about the practicality of the specific mode of assassination that he planned to use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 53).

(ii) <u>The (Chief of) Station Took "Exploratory Steps" in Furtherance of the Assassination Plot and Testified That He Destroyed Cable Traffic Related to the Plot</u>

Hedgman testified that after (Gottlieb's) visit, he locked the lethal substances in the bottom drawer of his safe, "probably" sealed in an envelope marked "Eyes Only" with his name on it (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 48-49). He said that his secretary was the only other person with access to the safe and that she would not have examined a package marked in this fashion (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 49).

Hedgman testified that it was "possible" that he preserved the poisons in his safe until after Lumumba's death; at any

The cable traffic conforms to Hedgman's recollection. For two months after (Gottlieb's) arrival in the Congo, a regular stream of messages flowed between the Leopoldville (Chief of) Station and headquarters through the PROP channel. In late September and early October the cables concerned the initiation of Hedgman's top priority plan -- recruiting the aid of a particular agent thought to have sufficient access to Lumumba's entourage to be able to poison Lumumba.* In mid-October, Tweedy notified the (Chief of) Station that the assassination mission remained "HIGHEST PRIORITY", and he suggested sending additional personnel to Leopoldville to intensify "CONCENTRATION" on this operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/15/60).**

These cables were followed by Hedgman's report to Tweedy on October 17 that the agent he had picked for the assassination mission

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* CIA Cable (IN 18989, (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 9/27/60; CIA Cable (IN 20857, (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable (OUT 75900, Fields to (Chief of) Station, 9/30/60; CIA Cable (IN 24171) (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60. See Section ____, supra, for full treatment of these cables.

** See Section ____, supra, for more complete text of this cable.

> HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENTOURAGE. THUS HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPS INTEL NEEDED THIS JOB. (CIA Cable (IN 28936,)(Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 10/17/60.)

Hedgman testified that this operative left Leopoldville "sometime in October" which terminated their discussions about gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 61). The (Chief of) Station continued to communicate with headquarters about finding a means to move forward with the assassination operation and securing the necessary manpower to do so.

Hedgman confirmed Tweedy's view that although the assassination operation was still his highest priority, he was overburdened with responsibility for other operations so that he could not concentrate on the progress of the assassination mission:

> ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST THIS OP, ABLE DEVOTE ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT TIME, VIEW MULTIPLE OPS COMMITMENTS. (CIA Cable, (IN 28936,) 10/17/60.)

Due to his workload, the (Chief of) Station responded enthusiastically to Tweedy's suggestion of an additional case officer:

> BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA ... IF CASE OFFICER AVAILABLE [(CHIEF OF) STATION] WOULD DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTING AND DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS. (CIA Cable (IN 28936,) 10/17/60.)

The (Chief of) Station concluded this cable with the following cryptic recommendation, reminiscent of his testimony that he may have "suggested" shooting Lumumba to (Gottlieb) as an alternative to poisoning (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29):

> IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HQS POUCH SOONEST HIGH POWERED FOREIGN MAKE RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SCOPE AND SILENCER. HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGHT. HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLES NOW FORBIDDEN, WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON. (CIA Cable (IN 28936,) 10/17/60.)

The first sentence of Hedgman's recommendation clearly refers to sending a sniper rifle to the Congo via diplomatic pouch. The rest of the message is probably an oblique reference to the possibility of shooting Lumumba at the "OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON" -- in other words, at the first opportunity to find Lumumba outside the residence where he remained in UN protective custody. This interpretation is bolstered by a report sent the next month by the (Chief of) Station through the PROP channel for Tweedy's "EYES ALONE." Hedgman's cable described the stalemate which prevailed from mid-September until Lumumba's departure for Stanleyville on November 27; Lumumba was virtually a prisoner in UN custody, but inaccessible to CIA agents and the Congolese:

> TARGET HAS NOT LEFT BUILDING IN SEVERAL WEEKS. HOUSE GUARDED DAY AND NIGHT BY CONGOLESE AND UN TROOP.... CONGOLESE TROOPS ARE THERE TO PREVENT TARGET'S ESCAPE AND TO ARREST HIM IF HE ATTEMPTS. UN TROOPS THERE TO PREVENT STORMING OF PALACE BY CONGOLESE. CONCENTRIC RINGS OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POST IMPOSSIBLE. ATTEMPTING GET

> COVERAGE OF ANY MOVEMENT INTO OR OUT OF HOUSE BY CONGOLESE.... TARGET HAS DISMISSED MOST OF SERVANTS SO ENTRY THIS MEANS SEEMS REMOTE. (CIA Cable (IN 42478) (Chief of Station to Tweedy.)

Hedgman testified that all of his cable traffic about the assassination question would have been sent with the same extraordinarily stringent security precautions -- presumably referring to the PROP channel -- which concerned (Gottlieb's) visit and the confirmation of authorization for his instructions:

> I would have sent in a special channel anything dealing with Lumumba, at least that would touch upon his removal in one way or another. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 62.)

The (Chief of) Station also testified that sometime before leaving the Station, he destroyed all cable traffic relating to the assassination mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 89). Hedgman's best recollection was that he had received instructions to destroy those cables (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96). Hedgman said he had never before in his tenure as (Chief of) Station in the Congo destroyed cable traffic because of its sensitivity (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 91). But he stated that the cables relating to assassination were destroyed because of their extremely sensitive nature.* He said

* It is possible that copies of cables dealing with such a sensitive operation were also destroyed at CIA headquarters.

that eventually

> I destroyed a great deal of traffic, because the Congo was a highly sensitive area in which -- at one period I recall we had all of our files in the burn barrels. I mean, when you wanted a file, you went over and dug it out of the burn barrell. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 91.)

At the conclusion of his testimony about the assassination plot, the Chief of Station was asked to give a general characterization of the advisability of the plot and the tenor of the times in which it took place. His response indicated that although he was willing to carry out what he considered a duly authorized order, he was not convinced of the necessity of assassinating Lumumba:

> I looked upon the Agency as an executive arm of the Presidency.... Therefore, I suppose I thought that it was an order issued in due form from an authorized authority.
>
> On the other hand, I looked at it as a kind of operation that I could do without, that I thought that probably the Agency and the U.S. government could get along without. I didn't regard Lumumba as the kind of person who was going to bring on World War III or something.
>
> I might have had a somewhat different attitude if I thought that one man could bring on World War III and result in the deaths of millions of people or something, but I didn't see him in that light. I saw him as a danger to the political position of the United States in Africa, but nothing more than that. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 110-111.)

(f) Testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About the Degree of Support for and Perpetration of the Assassination Plot

There is a great variance between the testimony of Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy and the picture of the assassination plot presented by the Chief of Station and the cable traffic from the period. While the weight of the evidence demonstrates that the assassination effort was the "highest priority" at CIA headquarters among operations in the Congo, Bissell has no direct recollection of Gottlieb's mission to the Congo and Tweedy can recall nothing more than consideration of the feasibility of an assassination attempt.

(i) Tweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation To Poison Lumumba

As Chief of the Africa Division, Bronson Tweedy was the principal liaison at CIA headquarters with the Chief of Station in Leopoldville for all instructions, plans, and progress reports concerning the effort to assassinate Lumumba, which were communicated through the special PROP channel. Most of the reports and recommendations cabled to headquarters by the Chief of Station on the assassination operation were marked for Tweedy's "Eyes Only."

Tweedy personally signed both the cable which initially informed the Chief of Station that "SID" would arrive in Leopoldville, with an assignment (CIA Cable OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief of

Station, 9/19/60) and the cable of October 7 indicating that he had debriefed (Gottlieb) upon his return from the Congo (CIA Cable (OUT 78336), Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/7/60). Tweedy was also the "Eyes Only" recipient of Hedgman's reports on (Gottlieb's) arrival in the Congo (CIA Cable (IN 18989), (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 9/27/60) and the subsequent communications about the plan which emerged from the discussions between (Gottlieb) and Hedgman as the top priority -- infiltration of an agent into Lumumba's entourage to administer a lethal poison to the Congolese leader (CIA Cable (IN 20857), (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable, (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60; CIA Cable, (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 10/17/60).

Tweedy testified, however, without benefit of reviewing these cables, that he had no knowledge of the plot to poison Lumumba:

> Q. Do you have any knowledge of a messenger from CIA headquarters having to go to the Congo to provide the (Chief of) Station in the Congo with instructions to carry out the assassination of Lumumba, if possible, and also provide him with the tools to carry out such an assassination, namely, poisons and medical equipment for administering them?
>
> Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not. (Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 30-31)

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* See Sections 4(a) - 4(e) for full treatment of the cables sent in the PROP channel between Tweedy and the (Chief of) Station in Leopoldville.

When asked his opinion about the truth of the testimony received by the Committee that poisons were delivered to the Congo by Gottlieb, who carried instructions that they were to be used in the assassination of Lumumba, Tweedy replied:

> There is nothing in my experience with the Agency which would really bear on that point whatsoever. (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 39-39)

Tweedy added that if Gottlieb went to the Congo as a courier, "I will bet I knew it, but I don't recall it" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 35). Tweedy testified that it was "perfectly possible" for lethal biological substances to have been sent to the Congo, "but I don't recall it" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 30).

In response to a question about whether he knew about a cable from headquarters informing Hedgman that a messenger was to come to the Congo with instructions for him, Tweedy said that he would be "very surprised if I didn't [know], but I certainly have no recollection of it whatsoever (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 31).

Tweedy said that he "was not going to gainsay" the testimony of the Chief of Station that a cable was sent to headquarters through a special channel requesting confirmation that the instructions were to be carried out but he did not recall it (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 32-33).

Tweedy commented that rather than questioning the truth of the testimony of the Chief of Station,* the discrepancies in their

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* Tweedy expressed a high regard for the general credibility of the Chief of Station. Tweedy said that he never had occasion to doubt Hedgman's veracity or integrity, adding, "I would trust his memory and I certainly trust his integrity." (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36)

testimony could be attributed to his own lack of recall:

> I really am having trouble with this. I had to be reminded of so many things. . . [T]he things that I recall the most vividly about all my African experiences were. . . the things I was basically concerned with all the time, which was putting this division together and the rest of it. When it comes to operational detail I start fuzzy and you would have thought with something like thinking about Mr. Lumumba in these terms, that I would have gone to bed and got up thinking about Lumumba, I can assure you this wasn't the case. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 34)

Tweedy was firm, however, in his disbelief that "Gottlieb would have left instructions with the Chief of Station which would have empowered [him]. . . to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any further recourse or reference to headquarters" (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 32, 36). Tweedy said:

> In such a matter of this kind, headquarters would have wanted to have a last word up to the last minute. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36)

(ii) <u>Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With Bissell the Feasibility of Assassinating Lumumba and He Cabled Hedgman About Gaining Access to Lumumba For the Purpose of Assassination</u>

Despite Tweedy's lack of recollection about the actual plot to poison Lumumba, he did recall exploring the feasibility of an assassination attempt.

Tweedy testified that he had discussed the subject of assassinating Lumumba "more than once" with Richard Bissell in the fall of 1960 (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 14-15). Tweedy stated that he did not know

whether Bissell had consulted with any "higher authority" about exploring the possibilities for assassinating Lumumba (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 28). Generally, Tweedy said, when he received an instruction from Bissell he would proceed to implement it on the assumption that it was fully authorized above the level of DDP:

> I would proceed with it on the basis that he was authorized to give me instructions and it was up to him to bloody well know what he was empowered to tell me to do. (Tweedy, 9/9, p.13)

Tweedy characterized his discussions with Bissell about assassinating Lumumba as "contingency planning" (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 28):

> Tweedy. . . .I think it came up in the sense that Dick would have said we probably better be thinking about whether it might ever be necessary or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which case we presumably should be in position to assess whether we could do it or not successfully.
>
> Q. Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?
>
> Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed with him in any other sense but a planning exercise, . . . never were we instructed to do anything of this kind. We were instructed to ask whether such a thing would be feasible and to have the Chief of Station be thinking along those lines as well. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 15)

Tweedy said that the planning that he undertook pursuant to his conversation with Bissell included "a few" cables that he remembers sending to the Chief of Station asking him

> to keep in mind what sort of access one might ever have had to Lumumba. . .[in] the eventuality that we might wish to get rid of Mr. Lumumba personally. (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 19-21)

Tweedy did not recall inquiring about gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of abducting him from UN custody (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 24); rather he "supposed" that various means of assassination were being explored:

> Q. Would this be access to shoot him or would this be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries?
>
> Tweedy. I suppose all those types of things might have been considered. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 23)
>
> Q. In your discussions with Bissell, about the feasibility of an assassination operation, did poisons come up as one means that was being considered and which the (Chief of) Station should explore?
>
> Tweedy. I am sure it must have. After all, there are not many ways of doing it. Shoot a man, poison him, of course you could, I suppose, stab him or something like that. But basically you are talking about a contingency plan which I assume has the best possibility of protecting the involvement of the U.S. Government and if you want to do it in a manner which would be as distant, if that is the right word, as possible, I think poison would then stand high on the list of possibilities.

Tweedy did not "recall specifically" the response from the (Chief of) Station, but said he was "sure" that he received "a serious answer. . . a disciplined reply to an instruction from headquarters" (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 23,27).

Although Tweedy did not recall sending or receiving cables in a special channel concerning the "messenger" to the Congo or confirmation of his instructions, he acknowledged that the cables exploring access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassination would have been

sent in a channel that was even more closely restricted than the normal CIA cable traffic (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 22, 32-33). Tweedy said destruction of such cable traffic would have been left to the discretion of the (Chief of) Station and he did not know whether Hedgman destroyed the Station's copies (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 22).

Tweedy said "I would be surprised if I didn't" have a conversation with (Sidney Gottlieb) about "anything in his inventory that could possibly be used, including lethal biological substances (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 68-69). Tweedy "suspected" that "the first conversation along these lines would undoubtedly have been held between Dick Bissell and (Sidney Gottlieb)," which Tweedy then would have "followed-up" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 69).

Tweedy maintained that the period in which he explored the means of access for assassinating Lumumba remained "a planning interval and at no point can I recall that I ever felt it was imminent that somebody would say 'go'" (Tweedy, 9/9. pp. 18-19):

> Tweedy. It was always my assumption that at the time anything like this should occur there would have been some kind of real focus on the problem at probably a very considerable policy level within the Agency. . . and it never occurred to me that I would get a call or Bissell would ask me to come down to his office and sya go to it. Nor were we ever in a position where he said that I would merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got that far.
>
> Q. You didn't have any action plans for the assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or were aware of?

> Tweedy. No. Planning, yes, but nothing that ever got anywhere. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 19)

It is difficult to reconcile the cable traffic with Tweedy's testimony that no action plans were launched and that no authorization for implementing the assassination operation, authorization for Hedgman's approach to his agent to explore access to Lumumba's entourage is in accord with Tweedy's description of his inquiries about gaining access to Lumumba.

However, the fact that Tweedy was personnaly informed that the (Chief of) Station "PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP" (CIA Cable (IN 24171), (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60) is harder to reconcile with his statements that a "go ahead" on the operation was never imminent, especially in light of Tweedy's PROP cable the next week which told the (Chief of) Station that Lumumba's

> DISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CONSIDERATION. . . THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY (CIA Cable (OUT 81396), Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/15/60)

(iii) <u>Bissell Testified That He Did Not Recall Whether The Assassination Operation Had Moved From Planning To Implementation But It Was Not Against Agency Policy to Send Poisons to The Congo</u>

Richard Bissell testified that he did not remember discussing the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba with Bronson Tweedy, but it seemed "entirely probable" to him that such discussions took place (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 3-4).

Bissell said he "may have" given Tweedy specific instructions about steps he was to take to further an assassination plan, but he did not remember to do so (Bissell, 9/10,p.4). Bissell said that exploring access to Lumumba --"almost certainly" seeking information from the Chief of Station about access for poisoning -- would have been a "key part" of his "planning and preparatory activity" but he had no specific recollection of cable communications on this subject (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 6-8). Bissell remembered that he was aware that the Chief of Station had an agent thought to have direct access to Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10, p. 80).

Bissell testified that he "most certainly" approved any cables that Tweedy sent to the Chief of Station seeking information about gaining access to Lumumba but it was so sensitive a matter (Bissell, 9/10, p. 8) Bissell added:

> I think Mr. Tweedy, on the basis of an oral authorization from me, would have had the authority to send such a cable without my signing off on it. (Bissell, 9/10, p. 8)

Bissell believed that Tweedy would have known of Gottlieb's trip to the Congo, although it was possible that Tweedy was "cut out of knowledge of the specific operation" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 21). Bissell's lack of recollection of discussing his assignment to Justin O'Donnell* with Tweedy was the reason for his speculation that

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* Bissell's assignment to O'Donnell is discussed in Sections 5(a)(i) and 5(a)(ii), <u>infra</u>.

Tweedy might have been unaware of the true purpose of Gottlieb's visit (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 20-22).

Bissell did not recall cables concerning the dispatch of a messenger and subsequently confirming that his instructions were to be followed, but he said "This sounds highly likely. . . I would expect, given the background, that the confirmation would have been forthcoming" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 43).

It was "very probable," according to Bissell, that he discussed the assassination of Lumumba with Sidney Gottlieb, who was then his Science Advisor (Bissell, 9/10, p. 14). Bissell said that on a number of occasions he discussed with Gottlieb "the availability of means of incapacitation, including assassination" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 60).

Although he had no "specific recollection," Bissell assumed that, if Gottlieb went to the Congo, he had approved the mission, (which "might very well" have dealt with the assassination of Lumumba) (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 18, 20, 44). Despite his absence of specific recollection of these events, Bissell said, "There is nothing in mind that I remember that would be in conflict" with the testimony of the Chief of Station that Gottlieb carried poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).

Bissell testified that it would not have been against CIA policy in the fall of 1960 to send poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).

He classified "the act of taking the kit to the Congo. . . as still in the planning stage" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 49). Bissell acknowledged, however, that the dispatch of poisons and paraphernalia with which to administer them was an extraordinary event:

> It would indeed have been rather unusual to send such materials -- a specific kit. . . of this sort -- out to a relatively small station, unless planning for their use were quite far along. (Bissell, 9/10, p. 37).

Nonetheless, Bissell said that he "probably believed" that he had sufficient authority at that point to direct CIA officers to move from the stage of planning to implementation (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 60-61). In light of his absence of a specific recollection of these events, he stated that "if it be taken as established that Mr. Gottlieb took specific instructions 'to implement,' " Gottlieb would not have been acting beyond the mandate given to him by Bissell and it would show that the assassination plot "had then passed into an implementation phase" and that "authorization was given" (Bissell, 9/10/ pp. 39, 41, 49).

5. The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives in the Congo

Justin O'Donnell, a senior CIA officer in the clandestine operations division in 1960, testified that during this period he had been asked by DDP Richard Bissell to go to the Congo to carry out the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 11-12). O'Donnell said that he refused to participate in an assassination operation, but proceeded to the Congo to attempt to draw Lumumba away from the protective custody of the UN guard and place him in the hands of Congolese authorities (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 13-14).

Shortly after O'Donnell's arrival in the Congo he was joined by a CIA agent with a criminal background who was used the following year by the CIA as part of a program to develop a stand-by assassination capability. Late in 1960, one of the operatives of the Chief of Station in Leopoldville approached this agent of O'Donnell's with a proposition to join an "execution squad" (CIA Cable IN 18739, Leopoldville to Director, 12/7/60).

Despite the fact that O'Donnell was initially approached to be part of the plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba, it is unlikely that O'Donnell was actually involved in the implementation of that plot by the Chief of Station. Whether there is any connection between the assassination plot and either of the two operatives -- QJWIN and WIROGUE -- is less clear.

(a) O'Donnell's Operations in the Congo

(i) Tweedy and the Chief of Station Agreed That a Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to the Congo to Concentrate on the Assassination Operation

In early October, 1960, several cables sent in the specially restricted PROP channel dealt with a plan to send a "senior case officer" to the Congo to aid the Chief of Station with the assassination operation.* On October 7, Bronson Tweedy informed Hedgman that he "WOULD EXPECT DISPATCH TDY [TEMPORARY DUTY] SENIOR CASE OFFICER RUN THIS OP" by supervising a third country national operative (CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60). On October 15, Tweedy requested Hedgman's reaction to the suggestion of dispatching the senior case officer as soon as possible to concentrate on the assassination operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60). Two days later, the Chief of Station replied affirmatively:

> BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA. (CIA Cable IN 28936, Chief of Station to Tweedy).

The Chief of Station advised that his responsibilities for "MULTIPLE OPS" had restricted the amount of time he was able to devote to the assassination operation (CIA Cable, 10/17/60).

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* See Section 4(e), supra, for full treatment of these cables.

(ii) Bissell Discussed Assassination of Lumumba With O'Donnell and Sent Him to Congo: October-November 1960

Probably shortly after the Chief of Station's cable of October 17 requesting the assignment of a senior case officer to concentrate on the assassination operation, Richard Bissell broached the subject with CIA officer Justin O'Donnell.

At that time, O'Donnell was the Deputy Chief of a component of the Directorate of Plans -- the CIA's covert action arm (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 8).

Justin O'Donnell testified that in October of 1960, he was asked by Richard Bissell to undertake the mission of assassinating Patrice Lumumba (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 11-12; 9/11/75, pp. 19, 43):

> O'Donnell: He called me in and he told me he wanted to go down to the Belgian Congo, the former Belgian Congo, and to eliminate Lumumba . . . .
>
> Q: What did you understand him to mean by eliminate?
>
> O'Donnell: To kill him and thereby eliminate his influence.
>
> Q: What was the basis for your interpreting his remarks, whatever his precise language, as meaning that he was talking about assassination rather than merely neutralizing him through some other means?
>
> O'Donnell: It was not neutralization . . . Clearly the context of our talk was to kill him. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 11-12.)

O'Donnell reacted strongly to Bissell's instruction:

> I told him that I would absolutely not have any part of killing Lumumba. He said, I want you to go over and talk to Sidney Gottlieb. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 12.)

Gottlieb was a CIA scientist who was at that time the Science Advisor to Bissell (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 14).

O'Donnell said it was "inconceivable that Bissell would direct such a mission without the personal permission of Allen Dulles" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 44). But the question of authorization was never raised by Bissell:

> I assumed that he had authority from Mr. Dulles in such an important issue, but it was not discussed, nor did he purport to have higher authority to do it. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 15.)

O'Donnell promptly met with Gottlieb and testified that he was "sure that Mr. Bissell had called Gottlieb and told him I was coming over" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13; 9/11/75, p. 7). O'Donnell said that Gottlieb told him "that there were four or five ... lethal means of disposing of Lumumba" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13). O'Donnell recalled that "one of the methods was a virus and the others included poison" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 12; 9/11/75, p. 7). O'Donnell said that Gottlieb "didn't even hint ... that he had been in the Congo and that he had transported any lethal agent to the Congo" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 7-A).

After speaking with Gottlieb, O'Donnell said:

> I then left his office, and I went back to Mr. Bissell's office and I told him in no way would I have any part in the assassination of Lumumba ... and reasserted in absolute terms that I would not be involved in a murder attempt. (O'Donnell 9/11/75, p. 43.)

(O'Donnell) said that in one of his two conversations with Bissell about Lumumba, he raised the prospect "that conspiracy to commit murder being done in the District of Columbia might be in violation of federal law" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 14). He said that Bissell "airily dismissed" this prospect (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 14).

Despite his refusal to participate in assassination, (O'Donnell) agreed to go to the Congo on a general mission to "neutralize" Lumumba "as a political factor" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 43-44):

> I said I would go down and I would have no compunction about operating to draw Lumumba out [of UN custody], to run an operation to neutralize his operations which were against Western interests, against, I thought, American interests. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13.)

(O'Donnell) added that his objective was to

> neutralize Lumumba's influence ... and his activities against [a Congolese leader], whom at that time you might say was our close instrument, he was the man we had put our chips on. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 20.)

Bissell also recalled that, after their discussions about assassination, (O'Donnell) went to the Congo "with the assignment ... of looking at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 53).

Although (O'Donnell) did not formulate a precise plan until he reached the Congo, he discussed a general strategy with Bissell:

> Mr. O'Donnell: I told Mr. Bissell that I would be willing to go down to neutralize his activities and operations and try to bring him out [of UN custody] and turn him over to the Congolese authorities, that is correct.
>
> Senator Mondale: Was it discussed then that his life might be taken by the Congolese authorities?
>
> Mr. O'Donnell: It was, I think, considered in the -- not to have him killed, but then it would have been a Congolese being judged by Congolese for Congolese crimes. Yes, I think it was discussed. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 38.)

There was a "very, very high probability" that Lumumba would receive capital punishment at the hands of the Congolese authorities, according to O'Donnell (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 24). But O'Donnell "had no compunction about bringing him out and then having him tried by a jury of his peers" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 14).

Although O'Donnell had expressed his aversion to assassination to Bissell and had undertaken a more general mission to "neutralize" Lumumba's influence, it was clear to him that Bissell was still interested in the assassination of Lumumba:

> in leaving at the conclusion of our second discussion ... he said, well, I wouldn't rule out that possibility -- meaning the possibility of the elimination or the killing of Lumumba -- I wouldn't rule it. In other words, even though you have said this, don't rule it out.... There is no question about it, he said, I wouldn't rule this other out, meaning the elimination or the assassination (O'Donnell 9/11/75, p. 45).

O'Donnell had a distinctive recollection that after his second discussion of Lumumba with Bissell, he met with Richard Helms in order

to make his opposition to assassinating Lumumba a matter of record (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 44-45):

> [I]n the Agency, since you don't have documents, you have to be awfully canny and you have to get things on record, and I went into Mr. Helms' office, and I said, Dick, here is what Mr. Bissell proposed to me, and I told him that I would under no conditions do it, and Helms said you're absolutely right. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 15-16).

Richard Helms testified that it was "likely" that he had such a conversation with O'Donnell and he assumed that O'Donnell's version of their conversation was correct (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 22-23).*

William Harvey testified that O'Donnell had informed him about the conversations with Bissell:

> Mr. O'Donnell came to me and said that he had been approached by Richard Bissell ... to undertake an operation in the Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimination of Patrice Lumumba. He also told me that he had declined to undertake this assignment. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9.)

Harvey said that in a later conversation with Bissell, Bissell told him that he had asked O'Donnell to undertake such an operation (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9).

O'Donnell said that within forty-eight hours of his second discussion with Bissell, he departed for the Congo (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 45-46).

* Helms testified that he did not follow-up on this conversation in any way. He did not recall why O'Donnell had gone to the Congo or what his mission was (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 32-33).

(iii) Bissell Testified That he Asked O'Donnell to Plan and Prepare for an Assassination Operation

Bissell remembered "very clearly" that he and O'Donnell discussed the assassination of Lumumba in the fall of 1960 (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 75) and that O'Donnell reacted negatively (Bissell, 9/11/75, p. 18). According to Bissell, O'Donnell said that he thought that assassination "was an inappropriate action and that the desired object could be accomplished better in other ways" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 54).

Bissell also confirmed the fact that he had asked O'Donnell to see Sidney Gottlieb (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 44).

Bissell differs with O'Donnell's account on only one important point -- the degree to which Bissell's initial assignment to O'Donnell contemplated the mounting of an operation as opposed to contingency planning. O'Donnell flatly testified that Bissell requested him to attempt to kill Lumumba. In his first testimony on the subject, Bissell said that he asked O'Donnell "to investigate the possibility of killing Lumumba" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 54; see also pp. 55, 75). In a later appearance, however, Bissell stated that O'Donnell "had been asked to plan and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 24).

Bissell said that after his conversations with O'Donnell, he felt that it would be necessary to "postpone" the assassination operation because, "given O'Donnell's reaction, there was a risk

that the planning of such an operation would be blown" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 25). Despite his impression that he might have deactivated assassination operations against Lumumba at that time, Bissell could not preclude the possibility that the Hedgman/Gobblieb poison plot continued to move foward:

> [T]his had been in my mind a very sensitive assignment to him, limited -- with the knowledge of it limited very narrowly even within the Agency. And it is difficult to separate recollection from inference on occasion. But I seem to recollect that after this conversation with him, I wanted this put very much on the back burner and inactivated for quite some time. Now that doesn't rule out the possibility that some action through completely different channels might have gone forward. But the best of my recollection is, I viewed this not only as terminating the assignment for him, but also as reason for at least postponing anything further along that line. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 25-26).

In Tweedy's mind, O'Donnell's eventual mission to the Congo was linked to assessing the possibility for assassinating Lumumba rather than to a general plan to draw Lumumba out of UN custody (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 26).

(iv) <u>O'Donnell Arrived in the Congo and Learned That a Virus Was in the Station Safe</u>

On October 29, the Chief of Station was informed through the PROP channel that Justin O'Donnell was soon to arrive in Leopoldville "IN FURTHERANCE THIS PROJECT" (CIA Cable OUT 86798, Fields to Chief of Station, 10/29/60). On November 3, O'Donnell arrived

in Leopoldville (CIA Cable IN 38052, Leopoldville to Director, 11/4/60). Chief of Station Hedgman testified that he had been made aware by cable that O'Donnell was coming to the Congo (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 40). Hedgman said it was "very possible" that as a new Chief of Station he took the dispatch to the Congo of a senior officer like O'Donnell as a signal that CIA headquarters was "dissatisfied with my handling" of Gottlieb's instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 42).

Hedgman had a general picture of O'Donnell's mission:

> I understood it to be that -- similar to mine, that is, the removal or neutralization of Lumumba ... I have no clear recollection of his discussing the assassination. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 54.)

Hedgman said that he had no recollection of O'Donnell indicating one way or the other whether he was considering assassination as a means of "neutralizing" Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55). Hedgman said, "in view of my instructions, I may have assumed that he was" considering assassination (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55). Generally, however, Hedgman perceived O'Donnell as being unenthusiastic about his mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 56, 88-89).

When O'Donnell arrived in the Congo, he met with the Chief of Station, who informed him that there was "a virus in the safe" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 7-A; 6/9/75, p. 16). O'Donnell said he assumed it was a "lethal agent" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 37), although Hedgman was not explicit:

> I knew it wasn't for somebody to get his polio shot up to date. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 16.)

He added that if the virus was to be used for medical purposes, "it would have been in the custody of the State Department" personnel, not the CIA station (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 36).

O'Donnell said that he did not recall that Hedgman mentioned the source of the virus (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 8).* But O'Donnell assumed that it had come from Sidney Gottlieb's office:

> It would have had to have come from Washington, in my estimation, and I would think, since it had been discussed with Gottlieb that it probably would have emanated from his office. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 28.)

Hedgman did not recall discussing Gottlieb's trip to the Congo with O'Donnell, but "assumed" that he did so (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 60-61).

O'Donnell was "certain" that the virus had arrived before he did (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 24). He was surprised to learn that such a virus was being held at the Leopoldville station because he had refused an assassination mission before departing for the Congo (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 17).

O'Donnell stated that he knew of no other instance where a lethal biological substance was in the possession of a CIA station (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 50). He assumed that its purpose was assassination:

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* When O'Donnell was informed about Hedgman's testimony on the visit of Gottlieb to the Congo and the plot to poison Lumumba, he said, "I believe absolutely in its credibility" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 53). O'Donnell found nothing in the facts as he knew them, nor in Hedgman's character to raise a question about that testimony. O'Donnell regarded Hedgman as "an honest and a decent man" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 19) -- "a totally truthful man" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 56).

> My feeling definitely is that it was for a specific purpose, and was just not an all-purpose capability there begin held for targets of opportunity, unspecified targets. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 49.)

At several points, O'Donnell stated that he did not think that Lumumba was the target specified for the use of the virus (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 17; 9/11/75, p. 48). But he allowed for that possibility:

> I supposed it was for a lethal operation, very possibly Lumumba, but very possibly in connection with other people. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 24; <u>accord</u>. 6/9/75, p. 17.)

His final word on the subject was that he assumed that the "specific purpose" of the virus was the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 50).

O'Donnell said that the Chief of Station never indicated that O'Donnell was to employ the virus (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 52). In fact, O'Donnell testified that Hedgman "never discussed his assassination effort, he never even indicated that this was one." (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 54.)

While Hedgman has no direct recollection of discussing his assassination operation with O'Donnell, he "assumed" that he had at least discussed with O'Donnell the problem of gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 55, 60). O'Donnell testified, however, that because he was "morally opposed to assassination" he would "absolutely not" have

explored the means by which such access could be gained, nor would he have undertaken a mission to the Congo if it involved assessment of the situation for an assassination operation by someone else (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 26).

O'Donnell was "sure" that he "related everything" to Hedgman about his conversations with Bissell concerning the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 46). Hedgman, however, had no recollection of learning this from O'Donnell (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 56).

Beyond this, O'Donnell said that his discussions of assassination with Hedgman were general and philosophical, dealing with "the morality of assassinations" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 46, 54):

> From my point of view I told him I had moral objections to it, not just qualms, but objections. I didn't think it was the right thing to do. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 9).

When asked to characterize Hedgman's attitude toward assassination based on those discussions, O'Donnell said:

> I will answer your question just as fairly and as scrupulously as I can. I have a great deal of respect for Hedgman. And if he said something, I would believe him to be speaking the truth as he knew it without shading it.... The best I could say, I think, would be this, that he would not have been opposed in principle to assassination in the interests of national security.... I know that he is a man of great moral perception and decency and honor, and so forth. And that it would disturb him to be engaged in something like that. But I think I would have to say that in our conversations, my memory of those, at no time would he rule it out as being a possibility. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 18.)

(v) <u>O'Donnell Planned to "Neutralize" Lumumba by Turning Him Over to Congolese Authorities and Requested the Assignment of Agent QJWIN to Leopoldville as His Alter Ego</u>

After Justin O'Donnell arrived in the Congo, he formulated a plan for "neutralizing" Lumumba by drawing him away from the custody of the UN force which was guarding his residence:

> O'Donnell: [W]hat I wanted to do was to get him out, to trick him out, if I could, and then turn him over ... to the legal authorities and let him stand trial. Because he had atrocity attributed to him for which he could very well stand trial.
>
> Q: And for which he could very well have received capital punishment?
>
> O'Donnell: Yes. And I am not opposed to capital punishment. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 20-21.)*

To implement his plan, O'Donnell made arrangements to rent "an observation post over the palace in which Lumumba was safely ensconced"

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* According to an earlier report from the Chief of Station, it was the view of the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations that arrest by Congolese authorities was "JUST A TRICK TO ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA" (CIA Cable Leop Chief of Station to Director, 10/11/60). The Chief of Station proceeded to recommend Lumumba's arrest in the same cable:

> STATION HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED [CONGOLESE] LEADERS ARREST LUMUMBA IN BELIEF LUMUMBA WILL CONTINUE BE THREAT TO STABILITY CONGO UNTIL REMOVED FROM SCENE (CIA Cable, 10/11/60).

(O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 20).* (O'Donnell) also "spotted" a member of the UN guard and made his acquaintance to recruit him for an attempt to lure Lumumba outside UN protective custody (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 20; 9/11/75, p. 21).

(O'Donnell) said that he cabled progress reports on his plan to CIA headquarters (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 26). He also said that he informed the (Chief of) Station about his plan (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 56).

In connection with his effort to draw Lumumba out of UN custody, (O'Donnell) arranged for a CIA agent, whose code name was QJWIN, to come to the Congo to work with him (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 19):

> What I wanted to use him for was ... counter-espionage[.]... I had to screen the U.S. participation in this ... by using a foreign national whom we knew, trusted, and had worked with ... the idea was for me to use him as an alter ego. (O'Donnell) Tr., pp. 19-20.)

In mid-November, two cables from Leopoldville urged CIA headquarters to send QJWIN as soon as possible (CIA Cable (IN 41261), Leopoldville to Director, 11/11/60) with this message:

> LOCAL OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE IMMEDIATE EXPEDITION OF QJWIN TRAVEL TO LEOPOLDVILLE. (CIA Cable (IN 41556), Leopoldville to Director, 11/13/60.)

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* A cable from the (Chief of) Station to Tweedy in mid-November reported that the double guard of United Nations and Congolese troops around Lumumba's residence thwarted this plan: "CONCENTRIC RINGS OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POST IMPOSSIBLE" (CIA Cable (IN 42478), (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60).

The cables contained no exploration of this sense of urgency about the "operational circumstances."

(b) Agent QJWIN's Mission in the Congo: November-December 1960

QJWIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background, recruited in Europe (Memorandum to CIA Finance Division, Re: Payments to QJWIN, 1/31/61), and supervised by CIA officer [redacted] In November 1960, at O'Donnell's request (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 19), agent QJWIN was dispatched to the Congo by [redacted] to undertake a mission that "might involve a large element of personal risk." (CIA Cable IN 36814, 11/2/60.)*

A dispatch from the CIA headquarters on his pending trip to Africa made clear the high degree of sensitivity accorded to his mission:

> In view of the extreme sensitivity of the objective for which we want him to perform his task, he was not told precisely what we want him to do.... Instead, he was told ... that we would like to have him spot, assess, and recommend some dependable, quick-witted persons for our use.... It was thought best to withhold our true, specific requirements pending the final decision to use [him]. (CIA Dispatch, [redacted]-147, 11/2/60.)

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* Part of the purpose in dispatching QJWIN to Africa was to send him from the Congo to another African country for an unspecified mission. QJWIN's mission to this country is not explained in the cable traffic between CIA headquarters and the various stations that dealt with him.

There is no indication in CIA files as to whether QJWIN completed this mission. O'Donnell said he had no knowledge of any mission that would have taken QJWIN to this country (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 32-33).

This message itself was deemed too sensitive to be retained at the station: "this dispatch should be reduced to cryptic necessary notes and destroyed after the first reading." (CIA Dispatch, [redacted]-147, 11/2/60.)

QJWIN arrived in Leopoldville on November 21, 1960 (CIA Cable IN 49486, 11/29/60) and returned to Europe in late December 1960 (CIA Cable OUT 54710, Director to Leopoldville, 12/9/60).

The CIA Inspector General's Report said that QJWIN

> had been recruited earlier by [redacted] for use in a special operation in the Congo [the assassination of Patrice Lumumba] to be run by Justin O'Donnell. (I.G. Report, p. 38.)

However, both O'Donnell and Bissell testified that O'Donnell refused to be associated with an assassination operation.* Instead, O'Donnell said he went to the Congo to attempt to snatch Lumumba from the protective custody of the U.N. guard and place him in the hands of the Congolese army. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 13-14, 37.)

According to O'Donnell, QJWIN was a man who was capable of undertaking an assassination mission:

> <u>O'Donnell</u>: ... I would say that he would not be a man of many scruples.
>
> <u>Q</u>: So he was a man capable of doing anything?
>
> <u>O'Donnell</u>: I would think so, yes.
>
> <u>Q</u>: And that would include assassination?
>
> <u>O'Donnell</u>: I would think so.
>
> (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 35-36.)

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* See Sections 5(a)(ii) and 5(a)(iii) above.

But O'Donnell had no knowledge that QJWIN was ever used for an assassination mission (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 36, 42).

O'Donnell said that, as far as he knew, he was the only CIA officer with supervisory responsibility for QJWIN and QJWIN did not report independently to anyone else (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 28). When asked if it was possible that QJWIN had a mission independent of that he was performing for O'Donnell, he said:

> O'Donnell: Yes, that is possible -- or it could have been that somebody contacted him after he got down there, that they wanted him to do something along the lines of assassination. I don't know. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 29.)

But he discounted this possibility as "highly unlikely" because it would be a departure from standard CIA practice -- placing an agent in a position of knowledge superior to that of his supervising officer (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 29).

Despite O'Donnell's doubt that QJWIN had an independent line of responsibility to the Chief of Station, a cable of November 29 shows that Hedgman was aware of WIN's activities.

In that cable, the Chief of Station reported through the PROP channel to Tweedy that QJWIN had begun implementation of a plan to "PIERCE BOTH CONGOLESE AND UN GUARDS" to enter Lumumba's residence and "PROVIDE ESCORT OUT OF RESIDENCE" (CIA Cable IN 49486, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/29/60). O'Donnell said that he had directed QJWIN to make the acquaintanceship of the member of the UN force whose help he sought for the plan to snatch Lumumba from UN custody

(O'Donnell) 9/11/75, p. 21). But Lumumba had left UN custody at this point to travel toward his stronghold at Stanleyville. This did not deter QJWIN:

> VIEW CHANGE IN LOCATION TARGET, QJWIN ANXIOUS GO STANLEYVILLE AND EXPRESSED DESIRE EXECUTE PLAN BY HIMSELF WITHOUT USING ANY APPARAT (CIA Cable, 11/29/60).

It is unclear whether this latter "plan" contemplated assassination as well as abduction. An affirmative reply from headquarters came through the PROP channel the next day which was also susceptible of interpretation as an assassination order:

> CONCUR QJWIN GO STANLEYVILLE.... WE ARE PREPARED CONSIDER DIRECT ACTION BY QJWIN BUT WOULD LIKE YOUR READING ON SECURITY FACTORS. HOW CLOSE WOULD THIS PLACE [UNITED STATES] TO THE ACTION? (CIA Cable (OUT 98314), Chief of Africa Division to (Chief of) Station, 11/30/60.)

(O'Donnell) said that agent QJWIN's stay in the Congo was "co-extensive with my own, allowing for the fact that he came after I did." (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 19.) (O'Donnell) said he left the Congo around the time of Lumumba's death in Katanga at the hands of Congolese authorities. (O'Donnell), p. 20.) QJWIN left in December shortly after Lumumba was captured by the Congolese army.

In a memorandum to arrange the accounting for QJWIN's activities in the Congo, William K. Harvey -- under whom (O'Donnell) had worked before being detached for assignment to the Congo -- noted the success of QJWIN's mission: "QJWIN was sent on this trip for a

specific, highly sensitive operational purpose which has been completed" (Memorandum for Finance Division from William K. Harvey, 1/11/61). O'Donnell explained Harvey's reference to the fact that QJWIN's mission had been "completed" by saying that once Lumumba was in the hands of the Congolese authorities "the reason for the mounting of the project ... had become moot" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 35). When asked if he and QJWIN were responsible for Lumumba's departure from UN custody and subsequent capture, O'Donnell said: "Absolutely not" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 35). Harvey did not recall the meaning of the memorandum, but he assumed that O'Donnell's return from the Congo constituted the "completion" of QJWIN's mission (Harvey, affidavit, p. ).

Despite the indication in the Inspector General's Report that QJWIN may have been recruited initially for an assassination mission and the suggestive language of the cables at the end of November, there is no clear evidence that QJWIN was actually involved in any assassination plan or attempt. The CIA officers who were involved in or knowledgeable of an assassination plot against Lumumba gave no testimony that tended to show that QJWIN was related to that plot.

The Chief of Station had a "vague recollection" that QJWIN was in the Congo working for Justin O'Donnell. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) But Hedgman did not recall why QJWIN was in the Congo. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) QJWIN was not a major operative of Hedgman's. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy did not recall anything about QJWIN's mission in the Congo

(Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 54-57; Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 54, 61).

William Harvey, from whose division QJWIN was on loan for his Congo assignment, had no specific knowledge of WIN's activities in the Congo:

> I was kept informed of the arrangements for QJWIN's trip to the Congo and, subsequently, of his presence in the Congo. I do not know specifically what QJWIN did in the Congo. I do not think that I ever had such knowledge.... If QJWIN were to be used on an assassination mission, it would have been cleared with me. I was never informed that he was to be used for such a mission. (Harvey affidavit, p. )

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He stated that Arnold Silver probably wrote the memoranda concerning QJWIN and submitted them for HARVEY's signature (Harvey affidavit, p. ).

(c) <u>QJWIN's Connection to Project ZRRIFLE</u>

After leaving the Congo in early 1961, QJWIN was used by CIA officer William Harvey as the principal asset in Project ZRRIFLE, a project which included research into a capability to assassinate foreign leaders.* QJWIN's role in Project ZRRIFLE was to "SPOT" figures of the European underworld who could be utilized as agents by the CIA if required. Harvey stated that before the formation of Project ZRRIFLE:

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* For a full treatment of Project ZRRIFLE, see Section ____, *infra*, on the "Executive Action Capability."

> [redacted] had not previously used QJWIN as an assassination capability or even viewed him as such. (Harvey affidavit, p. )

Although Harvey also had discussions with (Sidney Gottlieb) in connection with Project ZRRIFLE, he believed that (Gottlieb) never mentioned to him either QJWIN's activities in the Congo or (Gottlieb)'s own trip to Leopoldville (Harvey affidavit, p. ). Harvey had consulted with [redacted] about the initiation of Project ZRRIFLE (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52).

The (Chief of) Station in Leopoldville testified that he had never heard of Project ZRRIFLE, nor was he aware of any CIA project to develop the capability of assassinating foreign leaders. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 93.) Furthermore, Hedgman said that he was "quite certain" that he never discussed assassination capabilities or assets with Harvey at any time. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) Hedgman testified that [redacted] came to the Congo on a counter-intelligence mission during his tenure, but they did not discuss the plan to assassinate Lumumba. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 92.)

An interesting note on the value accorded QJWIN by the CIA and the inherent predicament for an intelligence agency that employs hoodlums is found in a cable from CIA headquarters to [redacted] in 1962. The CIA had learned that QJWIN was about to go on trial in Europe on smuggling charges. The cable suggested:

> IF ... INFOR TRUE WE MAY WISH ATTEMPT QUASH CHARGES OR ARRANGE SOMEHOW SALVAGE QJWIN FOR OUR PURPOSES. (CIA Cable (OUT 73943), 4/18/62.)

(d) <u>Agent QJWIN Was Asked By Hedgman's Operative WIROGUE to Join an "Execution Squad": December 1960</u>

The one incident where there is an explicit reference to assassination in connection with QJWIN involved his contact with WIROGUE, another asset of the Congo station.

WIROGUE was an "essentially stateless" European who was " a forger and former bank robber" and had fought with the French Foreign Legion (Inspector General Memorandum, 3/14/75.) He was sent to the Congo after being given plastic surgery and a toupee by the CIA so that he would not be recognized by Europeans traveling through the Congo. (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) WIROGUE was assessed by the CIA as a man who "LEARNS QUICKLY AND CARRIES OUT ANY ASSIGNMENT WITHOUT REGARD FOR DANGER" (CIA Cable OUT 86554, Africa Division to Leopoldville, 10/27/60).

The Chief of Station described WIROGE as "a man with a rather unsavory reputation, who would try anything once, at least." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96.) Hedgman used him as "a general utility agent" because "I felt we needed surveillance capability, developing new contacts, various things." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96.) Hedgman supervised WIROGUE directly and did not put WIROGUE in touch with Justin O'Donnell. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.)

A report on agent WIROGUE, prepared for the CIA Inspector General's office in 1975, described the training and tasking he received:

> On 19 September 1960 two members of Africa Division met with him to discuss "an operational assignment in Africa Division." In connection with this assignment, WIROGUE/1 was to be trained in demolitions, small arms, and medical immunization.... In October 1960 a cable to Leopoldville stated that ... Headquarters [had] ... intent to use him as utility agent in order to "(a) organize and conduct a surveillance team; (b) intercept packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (d) execute other assignments requiring positive action. His utilization is not to be restricted to Leopoldville." (I.G. Memorandu, 3/14/75.)

WIROGUE made his initial contact with Hedgman in Leopoldville on December 2, 1960 (CIA Cable (IN 18739), 12/17/60). He was given two instructions by Hedgman: (1) to "build cover during initial period;" and (2) to "spot persons for [a] surveillance team" of intelligence assets in the province where Lumumba's support was strongest. (CIA Cable (IN 18739), 12/17/60.)

Soon after receiving these instructions, agent WIROGUE approached QJWIN and asked him to join an "execution squad." This incident is described by Leopoldville (Chief of) Station Hedgman in a cable to CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 99):

> QJWIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL AS WIROGUE REPORTED LATTER TOLD HIM HE HAD LIVED ALASKA, JAPAN, SOUTH AMERICA, GERMANY AND OTHER PARTS EUROPE. QJWIN SAID WIROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH HE IN INTEL BUSINESS. STATION DENIED ANY INFO ON WIROGUE. 14 DEC QJWIN REPORTED WIROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS PER MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL NET AND BE MEMBER "EXECUTION SQUAD." WHEN QJWIN SAID HE NOT INTERESTED, WIROGUE ADDED THERE WOULD BE BONUSES FOR SPECIAL JOBS. UNDER QJWIN QUESTIONING, WIROGUE LATER SAID HE WORKINF FOR [AMERICAN] SERVICE.
>
> ... IN DISCUSSING LOCAL CONTACTS, WIROGUE MENTIONED QJWIN BUT DID NOT ADMIT TO HAVING TRIED RECRUIT HIM. THEN [(CHIEF OF) STATION] TRIED LEARN WHETHER WIROGUE HAD MADE APPROACH LATTER CLAIMED HAD TAKEN NO STEPS. [(CHIEF OF) STATION] WAS UNABLE CONTRADICT, AS DID NOT WISH REVEAL QJWIN CONNECTION [CIA]. (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director, 12/17, 60.)

The cable also expressed Hedgman's concern about WIROGUE's actions:

> ... LEOP CONCERNED BY WIROGUE FREE WHEELING AND LACK SECURITY. STATION HAS ENOUGH HEADACHES WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT AGENT WHO NOT ABLE HANDLE FINANCES AND WHO NOT WILLING FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS. IF HQS DESIRES, WILLING KEEP HIM ON PROBATION, BUT IF CONTINUE HAVE DIFFICULTIES, BELIEVE WIROGUE RECALL BEST SOLUTION. (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director, 12/17/60.)

WIROGUE's attempt to recruit QJWIN for an execution squad is explained by Hedgman as a mistake and by the actions of QJWIN as an unauthorized, unexpected contact which he did not initiate.

The Chief of Station testified that he had not instructed WIROGUE to make this kind of proposition to QJWIN or anyone else. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.) He added:

> I would like to stress that I don't know what WIROGUE was talking about as a[n] "execution squad," and I am sure he was never tasked to go out and execute anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.)

Hedgman suggested that WIROGUE may have concocted the idea of an execution squad:

> His idea of what an intelligence operative should do, I think, had been gathered by reading a few novels or something of the sort. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.)

Justin O'Donnell had no knowledge of an attempt by anyone connected to the CIA to recruit an execution squad and no recollec-

tion of WIROGUE (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 39-42). O'Donnell mentioned that agent QJWIN was considered for use on a "strong arm squad," but said that this was for purposes more general than assassinations:

> surveillance teams where you have to go into crime areas ... where you need a fellow that if he gets in a box can fight his way out of it. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 36).

Richard Bissell recalled nothing of the WIROUGE approach to QJWIN (Bissell, 9/11/75, p. 71). Bronson Tweedy did recall that WIROGUE was "dispatched on a general purpose mission" to the Congo (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 63). But Tweedy testified that WIROGUE would "absolutely not" have been used on an assassination mission against Lumumba because "he was basically dispatched, assessed and dealt with by the balance of the Division" rather than by the two people in the Africa Division -- Tweedy himself and his deputy, Glenn Fields -- who would have known that the assassination of Lumumba was being considered (Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 64-65).

The Chief of Station said that if the WIROGUE incident was connected to an actual assassination plan, he would have transmitted a message in a more narrowly restricted channel than that in which this cable was sent. His cable on WIROGUE's approach to QJWIN was sent to headquarters with a security designation that allowed much wider distribution than the PROP cables that he sent and received concerning the Gottlieb assassination assignment. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 102.) In contrast, he limited distribution of the cable about

WIROGUE only as a CIA officer would "normally do ... when you speak in a derogatory manner of an asset." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 101)

The (Chief of) Station maintained that WIROGUE's proposition to QJWIN to join an "execution squad" could be attributed to WIROGUE's "freewheeling" nature. Hedgman said:

> I had difficulty controlling him in that he was not a professional intelligence officer as such. He seemed to act on his own without seeking guidance or authority ... I found he was rather an unguided missile ... the kind of man that could get you in trouble before you knew you were in trouble.... (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 96-97).

But Hedgman did not disavow all responsibility for WIROGUE's actions:

> [I]f you give a man an order and he carries it out and causes a problem for the Station, why then as (Chief of) Station, well, you accept responsibility. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.)

In sum, the (Chief of) Station testified that despite the fact that the CIA was interested in the assassination of Lumumba during this period, agent WIROGUE's attempt to form an "execution squad" was an unauthorized, maverick action, unconnected to the CIA assassination plan.

Nonetheless, the fact that WIROGUE was to be trained in "medical immunization" (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75) raises the possibility that he was connected to the plot to assassinate Lumumba by means of lethal biological substances. The 1975 report on WIROGUE's case

by the Inspector General's office leaves this question open. The report concludes with the statement that "WIROGUE/1 spent most of his time trying to develop contacts and was not directly involved in any particular operation." (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) But, when the report was circulated in the Inspector General's office, the following comment was handwritten by Scott Breckinridge, one of the principal authors of the 1967 report on CIA involvement in assassination attempts: "ROGUE's pitch is too clear to be discarded out of hand as 'exceeding instructions.'" (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75)

6. <u>The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing About Lumumba's Death in Katanga</u>

There is no direct evidence of CIA involvement in bringing about Lumumba's death in Katanga. The CIA officers most closely connected to the plot to poison Lumumba testified uniformly that they knew of no CIA involvement in Lumumba's death.

(a) <u>Lumumba's Escape from UN Custody, Capture by Congolese Army, and Imprisonment at Thysville: November 27-December 3, 1960</u>

The strongest hint that the CIA may have been involved in the capture of Lumumba by Mobutu's troops after his departure from UN custody on November 27, was contained in a PROP cable from the (Chief of) Station to Tweedy on November 14 (CIA Cable IN 42478, (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60). In the cable, Hedgman reported that an agent of his had learned that Lumumba's

> POLITICAL FOLLOWERS IN STANLEYVILLE DESIRE THAT HE BREAK OUT OF HIS CONFINEMENT AND PROCEED TO THAT CITY BY CAR TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY. (CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)

The (Chief of) Station was confident that he would have foreknowledge of Lumumba's departure and that action plans were prepared for that eventuality:

> DECISION ON BREAKOUT WILL PROBABLY BE MADE SHORTLY. STATION EXPECTS TO BE ADVISED BY [AGENT] OF DECISION WHEN MADE.... STATION HAS SEVERAL POSSIBLE ASSETS TO USE IN EVENT OF BREAKOUT AND STUDYING SEVERAL PLANS OF ACTION. (CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)

There is no other evidence, however, that the CIA actually gained prior knowledge of Lumumba's plan to depart for Stanleyville. In fact, a cable from Leopoldville on the day after Lumumba's escape betrays the station's complete ignorance about the circumstances of Lumumba's departure (CIA Cable (IN 48484), Leopoldville to Director, 11/28/60).

But the same cable raises at least a question as to whether the CIA was involved in the capture of Lumumba enroute by Congolese troops:

> [STATION] WORKING WITH [CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT] TO GET ROADS BLOCKED AND TROOPS ALERTED [BLOCK] POSSIBLE ESCAPE ROUTE. (CIA Cable, 11/28/60.)

A cable of December 2 reporting Lumumba's capture militates against CIA involvement, however, because it portrays the Congolese forces as the source of the station's information (CIA Cable (IN 10643), Leopoldville to Director, 12/3/60).

The (Chief of) Station testified that he was "quite certain that there was no Agency involvement in any way" in Lumumba's departure

from UN custody and that he had no foreknowledge of Lumumba's plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 63-64). He stated that he consulted with Congolese officers about the possible routes Lumumba might take to Stanleyville, but he was "not a major assistance" in tracking down Lumumba prior to his capture (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 65).

Despite the fact that (O'Donnell) had planned to draw Lumumba out of UN custody and turn him over to Congolese authorities, he insisted that Lumumba escaped by his own devices and was not tricked by the CIA (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 22).

(b) <u>Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Where He Was Killed: January 17, 1960</u>

The contemporaneous cable traffic shows that the CIA was kept informed of Lumumba's condition and movements in January of 1961 by the Congolese and that the CIA still considered Lumumba a serious political threat. But there is no direct evidence of CIA involvement in bringing about Lumumba's death in Katanga.

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* Excerpts from cable traffic of January 1961 and from the testimony of CIA officers Hedgman, Tweedy, (O'Donnell,) and Helms (investigative report) should be inserted.

Group

> agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. (Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960)

The next day CIA Director Allen Dulles, who had attended the Special Group meeting, personally cabled to the (Chief of) Station in Leopoldville that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE . . . A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION" (CIA Cable (OUT 62966), Dulles to Leopoldville, 8/26/60). Dulles added: "YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE."

Although the Dulles cable does not explicitly mention assassination, Richard Bissell -- the CIA official under whose aegis the assassination effort against Lumumba took place -- testified that, in his opinion, this cable was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting and signaled to him that the President had authorized assassination as one means of removing Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33-34, 61-62; see Section 7(c), <u>infra</u>). Bronson Tweedy, who bore the primary administrative responsibility for activities against Lumumba, testified that the Dulles cable confirmed the policy that no measure, including assassination, was to be overlooked in the attempt to remove Lumumba from a position of influence (Tweedy, 10/9/75, pp. 4-5).

On September 19, 1960, Bissell and Tweedy cabled the (Chief of) Station to expect a messenger from CIA headquarters. Two days later, in the presence of the President at a meeting of the National Security

Council, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "would remain a grave danger as long as he was not yet disposed of" (Memorandum, 460th NSC Meeting, 9/21/60). Five days after this meeting, a CIA scientist arrived in Leopoldville and provided the (Chief of) Station with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and informed him that the President had authorized this operation.

Two mitigating factors weaken this chain just enough so that it will not support an absolute finding of Presidential authorization for the assassination effort against Lumumba.

First, the two officials of the Eisenhower Administration responsible to the President for national security affairs testified that they knew of no Presidential approval for, or knowledge of, an assassination plot.

Second, the minutes of discussions at meetings of the National Security Council and its Special Group do not record an explicit Presidential order for the assassination of Lumumba. The Secretary of the Special Group maintained that his memoranda reflect the actual language used at the meetings without omission or euphemism for extremely sensitive statements (Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 18-19). NSC staff executives stated, however, that there was a strong possibility that a statement as sensitive as an assassination order would have been omitted from the record or handled by means of euphemism. Several high Government officials involved in policy-making

7/21/60). Nonetheless, the attitude toward Lumumba even at these early meetings was vehement:

> Mr. Dulles said that in Lumumba we were faced with a person who was a Castro or worse . . . Mr. Dulles went on to describe Mr. Lumumba's background which he described as "harrowing" . . . It is safe to go on the assumption that Lumumba has been bought by the Communists; this also, however, fits with his own orientation. (NSC Minutes, 7/21/60)

The President presided over the other two NSC meetings. After looking at the records of those meetings, Johnson was unable to determine with certainty which one was the meeting at which he heard the President's statement (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 16).

However, the chronology of meetings, cables, and events in the Congo during this period makes it most likely that Johnson's testimony refers to the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960.

The meeting of August 18 took place at the beginning of a series of events that preceded the dispatch of a CIA scientist to Leopoldville with poisons for the assassination of Lumumba.* The September 7 meeting took place in the midst of this series of events.

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* The major events in the series, each of which is discussed in detail in other sections of the report, may be summarized as follows: The week following the NSC meeting of August 18, the Special Group was informed of the President's "extremely strong feelings about the necessity for very straightforward action" and the Group agreed to consider "any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). At this meeting, DCI Allen Dulles commented that "he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60; <u>see</u> Section 7(a)(iii), <u>infra</u>). The next day, Dulles sent an "Eyes Only" cable under his personal signature to the Chief of Station in

The NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, was held three weeks before the "quasi-coup" in the Congo -- the dismissal of Lumumba by Kasavubu -- which Johnson remembers as taking place "not long after" he heard the President's statement. The only other meeting at which Johnson could have heard the statement by the President was held on September 7, two days after this event.

Robert Johnson's memorandum of the meeting of August 18, 1960, indicates that Acting Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon* introduced

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* Leopoldville, indicating that it had been concluded in "HIGH QUARTERS" that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE AND THAT . . . THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION" (CIA Cable OUT 62966, Dulles to (Chief of) Station, 8/26/60). The Dulles cable added:

> WE WISH GIVE YOU WIDER AUTHORITY . . . INCLUDING EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT . . . YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE. (CIA Cable, 8/26/60)(See Section 2, supra, for more complete treatment of this cable.)

On September 19, a CIA scientist was dispatched from headquarters to the Congo on an extraordinarily sensitive assignment (CIA Cable OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 9/19/60; see Section 4(a), supra). On September 21, in the presence of the President at an NSC meeting, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of" (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60; see Section 7(a)(iv), infra). Finally, on September 26, the CIA scientist arrived in the Congo, provided the (Chief of) Station with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and informed him that the President had ordered the DCI to undertake an assassination effort (see Sections 4(a)-4(c), supra). The (Chief of) Station stated that he received confirmation from CIA headquarters that he was to follow the instructions he had been given (see Section 4(e)(i), supra).

** In 1960, Dillon served as Undersecretary of State, the "number two position in the State Department," the name of which subsequently changed to Deputy Secretary of State. In this position, he frequently (Continued)

on September 21, 1960, Allen Dulles stressed the danger of Soviet influence in the Congo. Despite the fact that Lumumba had been deposed from his position as Premier and was in UN custody, Dulles continued to regard him as a threat, especially in light of reports of an impending reconciliation between Lumumba and the post-coup Congolese government:

> Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the monent but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of. (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60.)

Three days after this NSC meeting, Allen Dulles sent a personal cable to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville which included the following message:

> WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP[OLDVILLE], SETTING HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable, OUT 73573, Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)

On September 26, Sidney Gottlieb, under assignment from CIA headquarters, arrived in Leopoldville (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to Director, 9/27/60), provided the Chief of Station with poisons, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and assured him that there was Presidential authorization for this mission (see Sections 4(b)-4(c), supra).

Marion Boggs, NSC Deputy Executive Secretary, who wrote the memorandum of the discussion of September 21, did not interpret Dulles' remark as referring to assassination:

Other Eisenhower Administration officials who were active in the Special Group in late 1960--Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin II, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston Merchant, and Deputy Secretary of Defense James Douglas--stated that they did not recall any discussion about assassinating Lumumba (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, pp. 1-2; Merchant affidavit, 9/8/75, p. 1; Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75).

(c) Richard Bissell Testified That, Despite His Lack of a Specific Recollection, He "Strongly Inferred" That the Assassination Effort Against Lumumba Was Authorized by President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles

Richard Bissell's testimony on the question of high-level authorization for the effort to assassinate Lumumba is problematic. Bissell insisted that he had no direct recollection of receiving such authorization and that all of his testimony on this subject "has to be described as inference" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48). Bissell began his testimony on the subject by asserting that it was on his own initiative that he instructed Justin O'Donnell to plan the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 54-55). Nevertheless, Bissell's conclusion--based on his inferences from the totality of circumstances relating to the entire assassination effort against Lumumba--was that an assassination attempt had been authorized at the highest levels of the government (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 32-33, 47-49, 60-62, 65).

As discussed above, Bissell testified that the minutes of meetings of the Special Group on August 25, 1960 and the NSC on September 21, 1960 indicate that assassination was contemplated at the Presidential level as one acceptable means of "getting rid of Lumumba" (see Sections 5(a)(ii) and 5(a)(iii), supra).

There was "no question", according to Bissell, that the cable from Allen Dulles to the (Chief of) Station in Leopoldville on August 26, which called for Lumumba's removal and authorized Hedgman to take action without consulting headquarters, was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting Dulles had attended the previous day (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 31-32). Bissell was "almost certain" that he had been informed about the Dulles cable shortly after its transmission (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 12). Bissell testified that he assumed that assassination was one of the means of removing Lumumba from the scene that is contemplated within the language of Dulles' cable (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 32):

> It is my belief on the basis of the cable drafted by Allen Dulles that he regarded the action of the Special Group as authorizing implementation [of an assassination] if favorable circumstances presented themselves, if it could be done covertly. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 64-65.)

Dulles' cable signalled to Bissell that there was Presidential authorization for him to order action to assassinate Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62):

> Q: Did Mr. Dulles tell you that President Eisenhower wanted Lumumba killed?
>
> Mr. Bissell: I am sure he didn't.
>
> Q: Did he ever tell you even circumlocutiously through this kind of cable?
>
> Mr. Bissell: Yes, I think his cable says it in effect. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 33.)

As for discussions with Dulles about the source of authorization for an assassination effort against Lumumba, Bissell stated:

> I think it is probably unlikely that Allen Dulles would have said either the President or President Eisenhower even to me. I think he would have said, this is authorized in the highest quarters, and I would have known what he meant. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48.)

When asked if he had sufficient authority to move beyond the consideration or planning of assassination to order implementation of a plan, Bissell said, "I probably did think I had [such] authority" (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62).

When informed about the Chief of Station's testimony about the instructions he received from Gottlieb, Bissell said that despite his absence of a specific recollection:

> I would strongly infer in this case that such an authorization did pass through me, as it were, if Sid Gottlieb gave that firm instruction to the Station Chief. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40.)

Bissell said that the DCI would have been the source of this authorization (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40).

Bissell did not recall being informed by Gottlieb that Gottlieb had represented to the Chief of Station that there was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 46). But Bissell said that assuming he had instructed Gottlieb to carry poison to the Congo, "there was no possibility" that he would have issued such an instruction without authorization from Dulles (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 47). Likewise Bissell said he "probably did" tell Gottlieb that the mission had the approval of President Eisenhower (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 47). This led to Bissell's conclusion that if, in fact, the testimony of the Chief of Station about Gottlieb's actions is accurate, then Gottlieb's actions were fully authorized:

> Q: In light of the entire atmosphere at the Agency and the policy at the Agency at the time, Mr. Gottlieb's representation to the Chief of Station that the President had instructed the DCI to carry out this mission would not have been beyond the pale of Mr. Gottlieb's authority at that point?
>
> Bissell: No, it would not. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 65).

Bissell further stated:

> Knowing Mr. Gottlieb, it is literally inconceivable to me that he would have acted beyond his instructions. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 41.)

With respect to his assignment to Justin O'Donnell to "plan and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 24) Bissell testified that "it was my own idea to give

O'Donnell this assignment" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 50). But he said that this specific assignment was made in the context that an assassination mission against Lumumba already had authorization above the level of DDP (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 50; see also pp. 32-33, 47-48, 60-62).

that, while he could have created the capability on his own, any urgings would have come from Bundy or Walt Rostow. In a later appearance, however, Bissell said he merely informed Bundy of the capability and that the context was a briefing by him and not urging by Bundy. Bundy said he received a briefing and gave no urging, though he raised no objections. Rostow said he never heard of the project.

William Harvey testified that he was "almost certain" that on January 25 and 26, 1961, he met with CIA officials Sidney Gottlieb, the new Chief of CIA's Technical Services Division, and Arnold Silver a CIA recruiting officer, to discuss the feasibility of creating a capability within the Agency for "executive action" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). After reviewing his notes of those meetings,* Harvey testified that they took place after his initial

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* As to the date of these notes, Harvey was asked whether his notations "25/1 Sid G" and "26/1 AS" indicate that he spoke to Sidney Gottlieb and Arnold Silver in 1961, as opposed to 1962. Harvey testified as follows:

> Q: And is it your judgment that that is January 26, 1961 and is about the subject of Executive Action?
>
> Harvey: Yes, it is.
>
> Q: And it followed your conversation with Mr. Bissell that you have recounted?
>
> Harvey: . . . [W]ell, when I first looked at this, I thought this, well, this has got to be '62, but I am almost certain now that it is not. If this is true, this might place the first discussion that I had with Dick Bissell in early January and this is difficult to pinpoint because there were several such discussions in varying degrees of detail during the period in the spring, and very early in '61 to the fall of '61 period, but I did find out fairly early on that Silver

discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said, might have transpired in "early January" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). When Bissell was shown these notes, he agreed with Harvey about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10).

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had -- or that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with Arnold Silver and this discussion, at the very least, had to take place after I know Bissell already had discussed the matter with Silver (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52).

Harvey had also testified that, after receiving Bissell's initial instructions to establish an executive action capability:

> the first thing I did . . . was discuss in theoretical terms with a few officers whom I trusted quite implicitly the whole subject of assassination, our possible assets, our posture, going back, if you will, even to the fundamental questions of A, is assassination a proper weapon of an American intelligence service, and B, even if you assume that it is, is it within our capability within the framework of this government to do it effectively and properly, securely and discreetly. (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 37-A, 38).

The Inspector General's Report connected Silver and Gottlieb to the early stages of the executive action project as follows:

> Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with Arnold Silver and with Sidney Gottlieb. Since Silver was already cut in, Harvey used him in developing the Executive Action Capability.... Harvey's mention of him [Gottlieb] in this connection may explain a notation by Dr. Gunn that Harvey instructed Gunn to discuss techniques with Gottlieb without associating the discussion with the Castro operation. (I.G. Report, pp. 37-38).

It is evident from the testimony of Harvey and Bissell that the turnover to Harvey of the Roselli contact in November 1961 was discussed as part of ZRRIFLE (see Section (d), infra). Thus, their initial discussion of executive action can, at the least, be dated before November 1961 and the "25/1" and "26/1" notations would have to refer to January 1961.

bring a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 19-20). Harvey did not recall any mention of the White House or any higher authority than the DDP in his November meeting with Bissell (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 60-61).

Although Richard Helms was briefed and given administrative responsibility (as DDP) for Project ZR/RIFLE three months later, he did not recall that ZR/RIFLE was ever contemplated as a capability to assassinate Castro (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 55). Asked whether the actual assassination efforts against Castro were related to ZR/RIFLE (executive action), Helms testified: "In my mind those lines never crossed" (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 52). However, Bissell's testimony leaves more ambiguity: "the contact with the syndicate which had Castro as its target . . . folded into the ZR/RIFLE project . . . and they became one" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47). When asked by Senator Baker whether the executive action "capability . .. for assassination" was "used against Castro", Bissell replied that it was "in the later phase". (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47). The instruction from Bissell to Harvey on November 15, 1961, however, preceded the reactivation of the CIA-syndicate assasination operation against Castro by approximately five months.

(iii) Use of Agent QJ/WIN in Africa

QJ/WIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background who had been recruited by the CIA for certain sensitive programs involving surreptitious entries which pre-dated Project

ZR/RIFLE. Harvey testified that QJ/WIN's function after the advent of Project ZR/RIFLE in 1961 was restricted to the "spotting" of potential assets for "multi-purpose" covert use.

However, in the Fall of 1960--before Harvey was assigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agent QJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by [redacted] his supervising CIA case officer in Europe. William Harvey, as the Chief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staff on which [redacted] worked, had ordered QJ/WIN's mission to the Congo (CIA Dispatch [redacted] 147, 11/2/60) and arranged the financial accounting for the mission afterward (Memorandum to Finance Division from William K. Harvey, 1/11/61). [QJ/WIN's activities in the Congo are treated in detail in the discussion of the Lumumba case; see Section ___, supra.]

There are two factors which may raise a question as to whether QJ/WIN was being used in an ad hoc capacity to develop an assassination capability before ZR/RIFLE was formally initiated. First, there is a similarity in the cast of characters: Harvey, QJ/WIN, [redacted], and Gottlieb were connected with the Lumumba matter and reappear in connection with the subsequent development of ZR/RIFLE. Second, Bissell informed Harvey that the development of an assassination capability had already been discussed with [redacted] and Gottlieb before Harvey's assignment to ZR/RIFLE (Harvey, 6/25/75 p. 52; I.G. Report, pp. 37-38).

Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any firm evidence of a connection between QJ/WIN and the plot to assassinate Lumumba.

Documents indicate that consideration was given within the CIA to airdropping rifles into the Dominican Republic. At a June 21, 1960, meeting with [redacted] of the CIA Western Hemisphere Division, Ambassador Farland reportedly suggested possible sites for the drops.
(CIA memo, 6/21/60)

Documents also indicate that a meeting was held around the end of June 1960 between Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom and Col. J. C. King, Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division. Apparently King sought to learn the Assistant Secretary's view regarding "To what extent will the U.S. government participate in the overthrow of Trujillo." A number of questions were raised by King, among them:

> "c. Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene?"

King's handwritten notes indicate that Rubottom's response to that question was "yes" (CIA memo of 6/28/60; King affidavit) */

On July 1, 1960, a memorandum directed to General Cabell, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared for Colonel King's signature and, in his absence, signed by his principal deputy, [Rudy Gomez] (I.G. Report, p. 26). The memorandum stated that a principal leader of the anti-Trujillo opposition had asked Ambassador Farland for a limited number of arms to precipitate Trujillo's overthrow, and recognized that such arms

* Neither King nor Rubottom recalls such a meeting, nor does either recall any proposal for supplying sniper rifles. (Rubottom affidavit, King affidavit.)

Trujillo government could be successful unless it involved Trujillo's assassination.

He communicated this opinion to both the State Department and the CIA. In July 1960, he advised Assistant Secretary Rubottom that the dissidents were

> "... in no way ready to carry on any type of revolutionary activity in the foreseeable future except the assassination of their principal enemy."
> (Dearborn to Rubottam letter, 7/14/60)

It is uncertain what portion of the information provided by Dearborn to State was passed above the Assistant Secretary level. Through August of 1960, only Assistant Secretary Rubottom, his Deputy, Lester Mallory, and Staff Assistant Frank Devine, were, within the Latin American Division of the Department, aware of Dearborn's "current projects." (Devine to Dearborn letter, 8/15/60)*

By September 1960, Thomas Mann had replaced Roy Rubottom as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and Frank Devine had become a Special Assistant to Mr. Mann. While serving as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, Devine reportedly spent ninety percent of his time coordinating State activities in Latin America. It was in this capacity that Devine maintained almost daily communication with [redacted] and other officials of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division (Devine, p.7)

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*Dearborn's candid reporting to State during the summer of 1960 raised concern with the Department and he was advised that certain specific information should more appropriately come through "the other channel" (presumably, CIA communications). Dearborn was advised that his cables to State were distributed to at least 19 different recipient offices. (Id.)

> have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardly more, and we are not prepared to make them available. Last week we were asked to furnish three or four pineapples for a party in the near future, but I could remember nothing in my instructions that would have allowed me to contribute this ingredient. Don't think I wasn't tempted. I have rather specific guidelines to the effect that salad ingredients will be delivered outside the picnic grounds and will be brought to the area by another club. (Dearborn letter to Devine, 3/16/61)

After reviewing his "picnic" letter, together with the requests in the March 14 and 15 cables discussed above, Dearborn concluded during his testimony before the Committee that the "pineapples" were probably the requested fragmentation grenades and the restriction on delivering salad ingredients outside of the picnic grounds was, almost certainly, meant to refer to the requirements of the January 12 Special Group order that arms be delivered outside the Dominican Republic. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 25-27)

2. <u>The Passage of Pistols</u>

a. <u>Pouching to the Dominican Republic</u>

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In a March 15, 1961 cable, Chief of Station [redacted] reported that Dearborn had asked for three .38 caliber pistols for issue to several dissidents. In reply, Headquarters cabled: "Regret no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against shipment of arms" and indicated that their reply had been coordinated with State. (HQS to Station cable, 3/17/61) The Station Chief then asked Headquarters to seek the necessary authorization and noted that at his last two posts, he had received pistols via the pouch for "worthy purposes" and,

[redacted]

therefore, he knew it could be done. (Station to Hqs cable, 3/21/61) Two days later, Headquarters cabled that the pistols and ammunition were being pouched. However, the Station Chief was instructed not to advise Dearborn. (Hqs. to Station cable, 3/24/61)*

b. Reason for the CIA Instruction Not to Tell Dearborn

Owen testified that he believed the "don't tell Dearborn the pistol is being pouched" language simply meant that the sending of firearms through the diplomatic pouch was not something to be unnecessarily discussed. (Owen, pp. 78,79) Dearborn said he never doubted the pouch was used, since he knew Owen had no other means of receiving weapons. (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 33)

c. Were the Pistols Related to Assassination?

Dearborn testified that he had asked for a single pistol for purposes completely unrelated to any assassination consideration. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 29-31) He said he had been approached by a Dominican contact who lived in a remote area and was concerned for the safety of his family in the event of political reprisals. Dearborn testified that he had believed

* The Inspector General's Report, issued in connection with a review of these events, concludes that:

> "There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files that the pistols were actually pouched. The request for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a subsequent request for submachine guns." (I.G. Report, p. 60)

This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the March 24, 1961, Headquarters to Station cable, which provides:

> "C. Pouching revolvers and ammo requested TRUJ 0462 (in 20040) on 28 March. Do not advise (name Dearborn deleted) this material being pouched. Explanation follows."

the man's fears were well-founded and had promised to seek a pistol.*

Although there is no direct evidence linking any of these pistols to the assassination of Trujillo, a June 7, 1961, CIA memorandum, unsigned and with no attribution as to source, states that two of the three pistols were passed by [Owen] to [redacted] a United States citizen who was in direct contact with the action element of the dissident group. It should also be noted that the assassination was apparently conducted with almost complete reliance upon hand weapons. Whether one or more of these .38 caliber Smith & Wesson pistols eventually came into the hands of the assassins and, if so, whether they were used in connection with the assassination, remain open questions.

Both Dearborn and [redacted] testified that they regarded the pistols as weapons for self-defense purposes and they never considered them in any way connected with the then-current assassination plans. (Dearborn 7/29, p.70; [redacted] pp.38,73) However, none of the Headquarters cables inquired as to the purpose for which the handguns were sought and [redacted]'s cable stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to dissidents. (Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61) Indeed, the March 24, 1961,

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*Dearborn is clear in his recollection that he asked [redacted] to request only one pistol. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp.30,31) [redacted], on the other hand, testified that if his cables requested three pistols for Dearborn then Dearborn must have asked for three pistols. ([redacted] p.72)
The pistols were, however, apparently sent in one package (HQS to Station cables, 3/27/61 and 3/24/61) and Dearborn testified that, what he believed to be the one gun, came "wrapped up" and that he passed it. (Dearborn, 7/29, p.30)

cable advising that the pistols were being pouched is the very cable which was sent in response to a request by the dissidents for machine guns to be used in an assassination effort which had been previously described to Headquarters. As with the carbines discussed below, it appears that little, if any, concern was expressed within the Agency over passing these weapons to would-be assassins.

3. Passing of the Carbines

a. Request by Owen and Dearborn and Approval by CIA

In a March 26, 1961 cable to CIA Headquarters, Owen asked for permission to pass to the dissidents three 30 caliber M1 carbines. The guns had been left behind in the Consulate by Navy personnel after the U.S. broke formal diplomatic relations in August 1960. Dearborn testified that he knew of and concurred in the proposal to supply the carbines to the dissidents. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 42,43) On March 31, 1961 CIA Headquarters cabled approval of the request to pass the carbines. (Hqs to Station cable, 3/31/61)

b. Were the Carbines Related to Assassination?

The carbines were passed to the action group contact Wimpy Berry on April 7, 1961. (Station to HQS cable, 4/8/61) Eventually, they found their way into the hands of one of the assassins, Antonio de la Maza. (Station to HQS cable, 4/26/61; I.G. Report pp. 46, 49) Both Dearborn and Owen testified that the carbines were at all times viewed as strictly a token show

of support, indicating U.S. support of the dissidents' efforts to overthrow Trujillo. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 46-48; Owen p. 39)

c. <u>Failure to Disclose to State Department Officials in Washington</u>

There is no indication that the request or the passage of the carbines was disclosed to State Department officials in Washington until several weeks after the passage. In fact, on April 5, Headquarters requested its Station to ask Dearborn not to comment in correspondence with State that the carbines and ammunition were being passed to the dissidents. This cable was sent while Owen was in Washington, and it indicated that upon his return to the Dominican Republic, he would explain the request. The Station replied that Dearborn had not commented on the carbines and ammunition in his correspondence with State and he realized the necessity not to do so. (Station to HQS cable, 4/6/61)

Dearborn testified, however, that he believed, at the time of his April 6 cable, that someone in the State Department had been consulted in advance and had approved the passage of the carbines (Dearborn 7/29, p. 44)

3. Requests For and Pouching of the Machine Guns

a. Owen Requests Machine Guns (for Use in Assassination)

The Station Chief suggested that Headquarters consider pouching an M3 machine gun on February 10, 1961 (Owen, pp. 63,64; Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61). The request was raised again in March but no action was taken. On March 20, 1961, Owen cabled a dissident request for five M3 or comparable machine guns specifying their wish that the arms be sent via the diplomatic pouch or similar means. The dissidents were said to feel that delivery by air drop or transfer at sea would overly-tax their resources. (Station to HQS cable, 3/20/61)

The machine guns sought by the dissidents were clearly identified, in Owen's cable, as being sought for use in connection with an attempt to assassinate Trujillo. This plan was to kill Trujillo in the apartment of his mistress and, according to Owen's cable:

> "4. To do they need five M3 or comparable machine-guns. and 1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in event fire fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic job." (Id.)

In essence, CIA's response was that the timing for an assassination was wrong. Owen was told that precipitious or uncoordinated action could lead to the emergence of a leftist, Castro-type regime and the "mere disposal of Trujillo may create more problems than solutions." It was Headquarters' position that:

> "...we should attempt to avoid precipitous action by the internal dissidents until opposition group and HQS are better prepared to support /assassination/*, effect a change in the regime, and cope with the after-math." (HQS to Station cable, 3/24/61)

* Word supplied by CIA in previously sanitized cable.

The cable also stated that Headquarters was prepared to deliver machine guns and ammunition to the dissidents when they developed a capability to received them, but that security considerations precluded use of U.S. facilities as a carrier.* Soon, thereafter, on April 6, 1961, while Owen was in Washington for consultation with Headquarters, he reported on events in the Dominican Republic and

> "especially on the insistence of the EMOTH [dissident] leaders that they be provided with a limited number of small arms for their own protection (specifically, five M3 caliber .45 SMG's)." (CIA memo for the record, 4/11/61)

b. <u>Pouching the Machine Guns is Approved by Bissell</u>

Accordingly, on April 7, 1961, a Pouch Restriction Waiver Request and Certification was submitted seeking permission to pouch "four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used for self protection." (Pouch Restriction Waiver Request 4/7/61)

The request, submitted on behalf of the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, further provided:

> "B. A determination has been made that the issuance of this equipment to the action group is desirable if for no other reason than to assure this important group's continued cooperation with and confidence in this Agency's determination to live up to its earlier commitments to the group. These commitments took

* This same cable of March 24, 1961, is the one which advised that the revolvers and ammunition were being pouched.

in cables from Dearborn and [redacted]. (Station to HQS cables 4/25/61) On April 25, 1961, [redacted] advised Headquarters that [redacted] had informed him that Antonio de la Maza was going to attempt the assassination between April 29 and May 2. [redacted] also reported that this attempt would use the three carbines passed from the American Consulate, together with whatever else was available. (Id.)

In response to the April 26 cable, Headquarters restated that there was no approval to pass any additional arms to the dissidents and requested [redacted] to advise the dissidents that the United States was simply not prepared at that time to cope with the aftermath of the assassination. (See C/S comments, Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61) The following day, April 27, 1961, [redacted] replied that, based upon further discussions with the dissidents, "We doubt statement U.S. government not now prepared to cope with aftermath will dissuade them from attempt." (Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61)

Dearborn recalls receiving instructions that an effort be made to turn off the assassination attempt and testified that efforts to carry out the instructions were unsuccessful. In effect, the dissidents informed him that this was their affair and it could not be turned off to suit the convenience of the U.S. government.

(Dearborn, 7/29, p.52)

> additional support, coupled with fact ref. C items [the carbines] already made available to them for personal defense; station authorized pass ref. A items [the machine guns] to opposition member for their additional protection on their proposed endeavor." (Draft of HQS to Station cable, 5/2/61).

The cable was never sent.

In his testimony before the Committee, Bissell characterized his reasoning for recommending release of the machine guns as:

> ". . . having made already a considerable investment in this dissident group and its plans that we might as well make the additional investment." (Bissell, 7/22, p.127)

The following day, May 3, 1961, [Ray Herbert,] Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of CIA, who frequently acted as liaison with the State Department in matters concerning covert operations in the Dominican Republic, met with Adolph Berle, Chairman of the State Department's Interagency Task Force on Latin America.

A Berle memorandum of the meeting states that [Herbert] informed Berle that a local group in the Dominican Republic wished to overthrow Trujillo and sought arms for that purpose. The memorandum continued:

> "On cross examination it developed that the real plan was to assassinate Trujillo and they wanted guns for that purpose. [Herbert] wanted to know what the policy should be.
>
> "I told him I could not care less for Trujillo and that this was the general sentiment. But we did not wish to have any thing to do with any assassination plots anywhere, any time. [Herbert] said he felt the same way." (Berle, Memo of Conversation, 5/3/61)

Copies of Berle's memorandum were sent to Wymberly Coerr, the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and to Special Assistant Frank Devine.

Both Herbert and Devine, who had been in almost daily contact with each other since August of 1960, had been advised of the assassination plans of the dissident group. In fact, Herbert, along with Bissell, had signed off on the proposed cable of May 2, releasing the machine guns for passage.

C. Special Group Meetings of May 4 and May 18, 1961

On the day following the Berle-Herbert meeting, the Special Group met and, according to the minutes:

> "The DCI referred to recent reports of a new anti-Trujillo plot. He said we never know if one of these is going to work or not, and asked what is the status of contingency planning should the plot come off. Mr. Bundy said that this point is covered in the Cuba paper which will be discussed at a high level in the very near future." (Special Group Minutes, 5/4/61)

Once again, the cryptic reporting of Special Group Minutes makes subsequent analysis as to the scope of matters discussed speculative. It is not known to what extent and in what detail Allen Dulles referred to "recent reports" of a new anti-Trujillo plot. Certainly, the most recent report of such a plot was Dearborn's April 30 cable -- disclosing an imminent assassination attempt potentially utilizing U.S.-supplied weapons.

On May 18, 1961, the Special Group again considered the situation in the Dominican Republic and, according to the

to continue to take the same line until he received contrary instructions which clearly indicated they had been cleared in advance by the State Department itself. This cable from State was approved by Under Secretary Bowles. (Department to Dearborn, 5/16/61)

Ray Herbert referred to Dearborn's May 16 request in a memorandum he sent to Devine on the same date and asked to be advised as to the Department's policy concerning passage of the machine guns. Herbert noted that when this request was last taken to the Department, Berle made the decision that the weapons not be passed. (Memo to ARA from CIA, 5/16/61)

Devine responded to Herbert's memorandum on the same day, advising Herbert that the Department's policy continued to be negative on the matter of passing the machine guns.* Herbert's attention was directed to the January 12, 1961 Special Group limitation concerning the passage of arms outside of the Dominican Republic. A copy of Devine's memorandum to Herbert was forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of State, to the attention of his personal assistant, Joseph Scott. (Devine to Herbert memo, 5/16/61)

E. Dearborn in Washington for Consultation -- Drafting of Contingency Plans

At a meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1961, the question of U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic was considered and it was:

> "Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly both emergency and long-range plans for anti-communist intervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the

*

By May 27, 1961 Dearborn was advising the State Department that the roup was no longer requesting the arms and had accepted the fact that it must make do with what it had. (Dearborn to State Cable, 5/27/61)

> fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of association with assassination attempt."

The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President Kennedy, was sent to Dearborn on May 29, 1961. (State Dept. to Dearborn cable, 5/29/61)

VII. <u>May 30, 1961 and Immediately Thereafter:</u>

A. <u>Trujillo Assassinated</u>

Late in the evening of May 30, 1961, Trujillo was ambushed and assassinated near San Cristobal, Dominican Republic. The assassination closely paralleled the plan disclosed by the action group to American representatives in the Dominican Republic and passed on to officials in Washington at both the CIA and the State Department. (Dearborn cable to State, 5/30/61) The assassination was conducted by members of the action group, to whom the American carbines had been passed, and such sketchy information as is available indicates that one or more of the carbines were in the possession of the assassination group when Trujillo was killed. (I. G. Report, pp. 60-61). This evidence indicates however, that the actual assassination was accomplished by handguns and shotguns. (I.G. Report, p.61)

B. <u>Cables to Washington</u>

After receiving the May 29 cable from Washington, both Consul General Dearborn and Station Chief [redacted] sent replies. According to Dearborn's testimony, he did not regard the May 29 cable as a change in U.S. policy concerning support for assassinations. (Dearborn 7/29/75, p. 74).

He interpreted the May 29 cable as saying:

> "...we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate Trujillo, that is all right. But we don't want anything to pin this on us, because we aren't doing it, it is the Dominicans who are doing it." (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 104)

Dearborn testified that this accorded with what he said had always been his personal belief; that the U.S. should not be involved in an assassination and that if an assassination occurred it would be strictly a Dominican affair. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 100, 101)

In contrast the CIA Station Chief, [redacted] did regard the cable as manifesting a change in U.S. policy, particularly on the question of supplying arms. ([redacted] p. 120) He believed the May 29 cable was the final word in U.S. policy on this matter and consequently felt that the government had retreated from its prior position, of offering material support to the dissidents, and had adopted a new position of withholding such support. [redacted] responsive cable to Headquarters stated:

> "HQS aware extent to which U.S. government already associated with assassination. If we are to at least cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in assassination preparation must be withdrawn." (Station to HQS cable, 5/30/61)

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## III. CIA's Implementation of Track II

### A. Evolution of CIA Strategy

The President's instruction to the CIA on September 15 to prevent Allende's assumption of power was given in the context of a broad U.S. Government effort to achieve that end. The September 15 instruction to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a military coup d'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup in Chilean military circles, there was little indication that it would actually take place without active U.S. encouragement and support.

> There was much talk among Chilean officers about the possibility of some kind of coup...but this was not the kind of talk that was being backed by, you know, serious organizational planning.
> (Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 32)

#### 1. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach

Although efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende victory continued simultaneous with Track II, the Agency premised its activities on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead end. On September 21, CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in Santiago:

> Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assumption of power. Paramilitary legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective.
> (Hqs. 236, Sept. 21, 1970, para. 3)

The initial strategy attempted to enlist President Frei in promoting a coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years. The Agency decided to promise "help in any election which was an outgrowth of a successful military takeover." (Nov. 18, 1970 Helms memo to Kissinger) Under this plan Frei would invite the military to take over, dissolve the Congress, and proclaim a new election. (A private U.S. citizen who had been a conduit for CIA funds to Frei's 1964 campaign was sent to see him)

with this message on September 24. (Task Force Log, September 23)

Thomas Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans, testified:

> So this was in a sense not Track II, but in a sense another aspect of a quiet and hopefully non-violent military coup....This was abandoned when the military were reluctant to push Frei publicly...and, number two, Frei was reluctant to leave on his own in the absence of pressure from the military....There was left as the only chance of success a straight military coup.
> (Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1975, p. 6)

At the same time, the Station in Santiago reported:

> Strong reasons for thinking neither Frei nor Schneider will act. For that reason any scenario in which either has to play an active role now appears utterly unrealistic. Overtures to lower echelon officers (e.g., Valenzuela) can of course be made. This involves promoting Army split.
> (Stn. to Hqs. 424, September 23, 1970)

2. Military Solution

President Frei's failure even to attempt to persuade his own party convention on October 3-4 from reaching a compromise with Allende ended all hope of using him to prevent an Allende presidency. (November 18 memo, Helms to Kissinger, page 16) Thus, by the beginning of October, it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have to be found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the top leadership of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene Schneider, constituted a stumbling block. (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970; Santiago 439, September 30, 1970) The Agency's task was to cause a coup in a highly unpromising situation and to overcome the formidable obstacles represented by Frei's inaction, Schneider's strong constitutionalism, and the absence of organization and enthusiasm among those officers who were interested in a coup.

A three-fold program was set into motion: TOP SECRET

David A. Phillips, Chief of Station in Rio de Janeiro, was summoned back to Washington to head the operation. With the exception of the Division Chief, William Broe, his deputy James Flannery and the head of the Chile Branch, no other officers in the Division were aware of the task force's activities, not even those officers who normally had responsibility for Chile. The task force had a special communications channel to Santiago and Buenos Aires to compartment cable traffic about Track II. (November 18, 1970, Helms to Kissinger memo, page 3) Most of the significant operational decisions were made by Phillips, Broe and Karamessines, who met on a daily basis.

It should be noted that all those involved with the task force described the pressure from the White House as intense. Indeed, Karamessines has said that Kissinger "left no doubt in my mind that he was under the heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was placing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished." (Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, page 7) The Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, James Flannery, testified that pressure was "as tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme." (Flannery testimony, July 15, 1975, page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone through a period as we did on the Chilean thing. I mean it was just constant, constant....Just continual pressure....It was coming from the White House." (Broe testimony, August 4, 1975, page 55)

C. <u>The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency Relations</u>

The CIA Station in Santiago had inadequate contacts within the Chilean military to carry out its task. However, the U.S. Army Attache in Santiago, Colonel Paul Wimert, knew the Chilean military

very well due to his five years of service there and his broad personal contacts among the Chilean officers. Following a proposal by the Chief of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting intelligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. S. support for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee:

> We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military, the senior military which we had not maintained and did not have, but which we felt confident that our military representative in Chile had....And we got the approval of the DIA to enlist the cooperation of Colonel Wimert in our effort to procure intelligence.
>
> (Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6)

To obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested message for the Director of DIA to send to the Army Attache in Santiago through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director, General Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28, 1970.* During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of the Army Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized transmission of a message directing the Army Attache:

> ...to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence, his deputy, in contacting and advising the principal military figures who might play a decisive role in any move which might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.
>
> Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense Attache of this message, or give them any indication of its portent. In the course of your routine activities, act in accordance with the Ambassador's instructions. Simultaneously, I wish--and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion with the CAS chief.

---

* General Bennett returned to the United States on the evening of October 10, 1970. General Philpott was Acting Director in Bennett's absence.

This message is for your eyes only, and should not be discussed with any person other than those CAS officers who will be knowledgeable. CAS will identify them. (Headquarters 380 to Santiago)

For this and all subsequent messages intended for the Army Attache, the secret CIA communications channel was used.

Both General Philpott and Thomas Karamessines testified that initially the Army Attache would be used only to "obtain or procure" intelligence on Chilean military officers.* (Philpott, p. 11; Karamessines, p. 6) The September 28, 1970 message to the Army Attache, however, did in fact trigger his deep involvement in the coup attempt. According to the Attache's testimony, he received day-to-day instructions from the Chief of Station, and on occasion, the COS would show him messages ostensibly from Generals Bennett and/or Philpott, directing him to take certain actions. The COS also transmitted messages from the Army Attache to these Generals.

General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track II and that he never received any communication relating thereto, nor did he ever authorize the transmission of any messages to the Army Attache. General Philpott also testified that he had no recollection of anything connected with Track II after his initial meeting with General Cushman on September 28. (Philpott, p. 16)

U. S. Army Colonel Robert C. Roth, who in September and October 1970 was the Chief of the Human Resources Division, Director of Collection, DIA,

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* In this connection it should be noted that when questioned about this letter, General Philpott testified that he recalled signing an authorization such as that contained in the first paragraph of Headquarters 380 but that he did not recall the authorizations and instructions in paragraphs two and three.

testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett and Philpott on "a priority requirement to identify Chilean personalities who might be helpful in preventing the election of Allende as President of Chile." (Roth, Vol. I, p. 6) Though Roth recalls no mention of Track II as such, the goal of this mission is identical to that described in the message of September 28 bearing Philpott's signature.

Beginning on October 15, Roth kept a chronology of his activities connected with Chile. This chronology reflects that there was a meeting on October 21 regarding the preparation of biographic material on Chilean generals which focused on their willingness to participate in a military coup. Generals Bennett, Philpott, and a CIA representative attended. The chronology also shows that on October 21, Roth delivered a message to Mr. Broe to be sent by CIA channels.* A message was sent to Col. Wimert that same day, ostensibly from General Bennett, which authorized:

> FYI: Suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has been rescinded. This action does not repeat not imply change in our estimate of situation. On the contrary, it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situation develops as we anticipate. Request up date on situation. (Santiago 446; Ref: Headquarters 762) (Headquarters 934, 21 October 1970)

Roth testified that this DIA project ended on October 23 when he followed Philpott's instructions to deliver biographic information on Chilean figures to Mr. Broe at CIA. Philpott also instructed him that

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* Roth believes that General Philpott directed him to deliver this message and also pressed him on several occasions to seek a response from Broe to an earlier message to Colonel Wimert. (Roth, Vol. II, p. )

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"any further action on the subject would henceforth be the responsibility of the CIA and that DIA would perform normal support functions." (Roth, p. 8)*

Both Bennett and Philpott testified that the activities described by Roth were routine DIA activities. However, Colonel Roth testified:

> I believe my impression at the time, or my recollection, is that I was informed that there was concern at the highest U.S. Governmental level over the possible election of Allende, that DIA then had a priority responsibility of coming up with the identities of key Chilean personalities that would be helpful, and so forth. I have nothing specific as to the nature of the instructions or the channels through which they came.
>
> Q. It was your sense at the time that you were working on a project that if it had not been initiated by, at least had the attention of or concern of, the highest level?

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* Roth's chronology also indicates that Philpott had asked that Broe be queried on two or three occasions regarding a report from Wimert and that Philpott instructed that only he (Philpott) would communicate with Cushman if the need arose. (Roth, p. 11) Roth also testified that Philpott advised him that communications with Wimert would be by CIA channels. (Roth, p. 41)

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Colonel Roth. That was my impression at the time.

Q. You understand from your work in the Defense Department that the highest level of government usually indicated the President of the United States?

Colonel Roth. I would assume that.

The CIA produced copies of several messages which identify Generals Bennett and Philpott as either the sender or recipient. Among these documents is a message relating to Track II which bears Philpott's purported signature. (Undated message. ca. 14 October 1970) General Philpott admitted that the signature appears to be his but doubted that it was and he could not recall signing it, or having seen it. (Philpott, p. ) CIA also produced messages of October 14 (Headquarters 762) and October 21 (Headquarters 934) conveying instructions from General Bennett to the Army Attache. General Bennett testified he did not authorize these messages:

> It is beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military assistance area. It goes beyond the responsibility which I had in terms that I would have to get the authority or the approval of the Secretary through the Chairman for covert action of this magnitude. This message would not have been signed by me. (Bennett testimony, p. 21)

According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to issue the directives contained in those messages (Karamessines testimony, p. 84)

The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents bearing on the issue of Wimert's Track II instructions or responses. A DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel O. Graham, the present Director of DIA, produced no copies of communication documents for the September-October 1970 period. (Graham, p. 6) However, Roth testified that detailed memoranda for the record which he prepared on his activities are missing from the files. (Roth, Vol. II, p. )

CIA officials maintain that they acted faithfully in transmitting messages to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sending a message without proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines was particularly forceful in this regard:

> ...I can recall no instance in my experience at the Central Intelligence Agency in which a message was received for an individual, an officer of the government anywhere, in whatever department, which was not faithfully, directly, promptly and fully and accurately delivered to that officer, or to his duly authorized representative.
> (Karamessines testimony, p. 79)

> We may have played tricks overseas, but it stopped at the water's edge, and we didn't play tricks among ourselves or among our colleagues within the Agency or in other agencies.
> (Karamessines testimony, p. 79)

> We could not remain in business for a day...if this had been the practice of the Agency. It would have been no time at all before we would have been found out, a single instance of the kind of thing you are suggesting might have taken place would have put us out of business.
> (Karamessines testimony, p. 80)

Dr. Kissinger denied he was ever informed of the Army Attache's role or that he authorized any messages to be sent to the Army Attache. (Kissinger testimony, p. 22)

The investigation to date has not resolved the conflict between the statements of the senior CIA, DIA and White House officials. There are four possibilities that could explain the conflict. First, Generals Bennett and Philpott were cognizant of Track II and communicated their general instructions to the Army Attache. This possibility would be contrary to their sworn testimony. Second, General Bennett was not aware of Track II but General Philpott was and communicated general instructions to the Army Attache. This possibility is supported by Roth's testimony but would be contrary to Philpott's sworn testimony and his duty to keep General Bennett informed. Third, the CIA acted on its own, and, after receiving initial authority from General Philpott, co-opted and ordered

the Army Attache without further informing any member of the Department of Defense of the White House. This possibility would be contrary to the sworn testimony of David Phillips, William Broe, Thomas Karamessines, and William Colby. Fourth, members of the White House staff authorized the CIA to convey orders to the Army Attache on the basis of high or highest government authority. Further, that the White House staff directed that the Army Attache's superiors in the Pentagon not be informed. This possibility would contradict the sworn testimony of Dr. Kissinger and General Alexander Haig.

D. The False Flag Base

In order to minimize the risks of making contact with the dissident Chilean officers, the task force decided in late September to set up a "False Flag Base," i.e., to send four staff officers to Chile posing as nationals of other countries to supplement Colonel Wimert's contacts with Chilean military officers.* Given the limitations of the Station's resources and Colonel Wimert's visibility, Headquarters felt the use of "False Flag Officers" was necessary because "We don't want to miss a chance." One of these officers posed as a Brazilian intelligence officer so that "any flap would be a Brazilian one." (Headquarters 363, September 27, 1970)

*The use of "False Flag Officers" is not, according to David Phillips, "an unusual practice," either by the CIA or foreign intelligence services. (Phillips testimony, pp. 47-48)

The False Flaggers were compartmented from each other and reported separately on their contacts to a "deep cover" CIA officer in Santiago who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of the Chief of Station, they received their instructions from Washington and not from him. (Chief of Station testimony (Felix), August 1, 1975, p. 27)

E. Chief of Station

Although most of the Station officers in Santiago did not know of Track II, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station were knowledgeable and the Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean officers. The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic:

> I had left no doubt in the minds of my colleagues and superiors that I did not consider any kind of intervention in those constitutional processes desirable....And one of the reasons certainly for my last recall (to Washington) was to be read the riot act--which was done in a very pleasant, but very intelligible manner. Specifically, I was told at that time that the Agency was not too interested in continuously being told by me that certain proposals which had been made could not be executed, or would be counterproductive. (Chief of Station (Felix) testimony, August 1, 1975, p. 10)

The Chief of Station's objection to Track II did not go unnoticed. The following instruction to the COS was sent on October 7: "Report should not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on action taken." (Headquarters 612, 7 October) Very simply, Headquarters wanted the Station to take orders quietly as was the Agency itself.

## IV. CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup

### A. The Chilean Conspirators

Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key individuals. One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before.* Following the "Tacnazo" revolt, and his dismissal from the Army, Viaux retained the support of many non-commissioned and junior officers as well as being the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian groups. (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July 15, 1975)

Another individual around which plotting centered was General Camilo Valenzuela, Commander of the Santiago Garrison. General Valenzuela was in league with several other active duty officers, including [redacted] (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, November 18, 1970) All of these officers, with the possible exception of [redacted] were in contact with Viaux as well.**

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*This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of dramatizing the military's demand for higher pay, but was widely interpreted as an abortive coup.

**The record of meetings between Viaux and the active duty military officers is incomplete. The record does show, however, that Viaux met with [redacted] around October 7. (Chile Task Force Log, October 7). On October 12 Viaux met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October). One cable from Santiago indicates that [redacted] may have been a member of Viaux's inner circle of conspirators (Station 545, 16 October 1970) At the very least, [redacted] was in contact with Viaux.

Although a distinction can be made between the Viaux and Valenzuela groups, as CIA witnesses did throughout their testimony before the Committee, the principal distinction between the two was that the latter was led by active duty military officers. The two groups were in contact with each other. The record also indicates that they worked together in at least two of the three Schneider kidnap attempts.

There was considerable communication among the various plotting elements. As Thomas Karamessines testified:

> ...I might add here that it seemed that a good dozen or more, maybe 20 Chilean senior officers were privy to what was going on (in addition to President Frei) and they were all talking to one another exchanging views and trying to see how best to mount the kind of coup that they wanted to see take place. (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)

B. Contacts Prior to October 15

The CIA's initial task in Chile was to assess the potential within the Chilean military to stage a coup. It recognized quickly that anti-Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros (police), but were immobilized by "the tradition of military respect for the Constitution" and "the public and private stance of General Schneider, Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated strict adherence to the Constitution." (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, p. 17) The Agency's task, then, was to overcome "the apolitical, constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military." (Ibid, p. 2)

Since the very top of the Chilean military, embodied by General Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prat, were hostile to the idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to the second level of general officers. They were to be informed that the U.S. Government would support a coup both before and after it took place.*
(Headquarters to Station 611, 7 October 1970) This effort began in earnest on October 5 when Colonel Wimert informed both an Army General ("Station's priority contact") an an Air Force General of the pro-coup

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*The military officers were told, for example, that should Allende be prevented from taking office, "The Chilean military will not be ostracized, but rather can continue to count on us for MAP support and maintenance of our close relationship." (Hqs. 075517, 7 October 1970)

U.S. policy. (Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October 6)*
Three days later the Chief of Station told [redacted] of the Carabineros that "the U.S. Government favors a military solution and is willing to support it in any manner short of outright military intervention." (Task Force Log, 9 October) [redacted] informed the COS that there was no chance of a coup by the Chilean Army high command. (Task Force Log, 10 October)

On October 7, Colonel Wimert approached members of the War Academy in Santiago who in turn asked him to provide light weapons. This was Colonel Wimert's first contact with the Army [redacted] to whom he would ultimately pass three submachine guns on October 22.** At this meeting, the [redacted] told Colonel Wimert that he and his colleagues were

> trying to exert force on Frei to eliminate Gen. Schneider to either replace him, send him out of the country. They had even studied plans to kidnap him. Schneider is the main barrier to all plans for the military to take over the government to prevent an Allende presidency. (Santiago 483, 8 October)

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*According to the CIA's wrap-up report on Track II, between October 5 and October 20, the CIA Station and the Army Attache--for the most part the latter--made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero officials. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 8 November 1970)

**In his testimony, Colonel Wimert indicated that the [redacted] was affiliated with General [redacted] (Wimert testimony, p. 52) In a cable sent to Headquarters on October 18, in which the [redacted]'s request for three submachine guns was made, the Station indicated that Wimert believed the Army officer, and his companion, a Navy [redacted] were in league with Admiral [redacted] (Station 562, October 18) At another point in his testimony, Wimert stated, "There was Valenzuela here and the Navy Captain and the Army Lt. Colonel and the Air Force General over here." (Wimert testimony, p. 107) The Committee has been unable to determine the exact affiliation of the Army Lt. Colonel. However, as previously stated, both General [redacted] and [redacted] were affiliated with General Valenzuela and Admiral [redacted] was in contact with General Viaux.

The next day, October 8, Headquarters cabled the Station in response to the Wimert-Lt. Colonel meeting. Headquarters took note of Schneider's resistance to coup plans and stated:

> ...This would make it more important than ever to remove him and to bring this new state of events...anything we or Station can do to effect removal of Schneider? We know this rhetorical question, but wish inspire thought on both ends on this matter.
> (Hqs. 628, 8 October)

During the first week of intensive efforts chances of success looked unusually bleak. The Chile Task Force Log commented:

> President Frei and the highest levels of the armed forces unable to pull themselves together to block Allende. The Chilean military's tradition of non-intervention, Frei's reluctance to tarnish his historical image, General Schneider's firm constitutional stand, and most importantly, the lack of leadership within the government and military are working against a military takeover.
> (Task Force Log, 8 October)

The following day the Station made reference to the "rapid(ly) waning chances for success." (Santiago 487, 9 October) This pessimism was not dispelled by their simultaneous judgment: "Station has arrived at Viaux solution by process of elimination." (Santiago 504, 10 October) Three days later the Task Force agreed: "We continue to focus our attention on General Viaux who now appears to be the only military leader willing to block Allende." (Task Force Log, 13 October)

If Viaux was the CIA's only hope of staging a coup, things were bleak indeed. His own colleagues, Generals [redacted] and Valenzuela described him as "a General without an army." (Santiago 495, 9 October) Yet in the first two weeks of October he came to be regarded as the best hope for carrying out the CIA's Track II mandate.

Although Colonel Wimert was instructed not to involve himself with Viaux because of the high risk involved (Santiago 461, 5 October), he served initially as a contact to Viaux through an "Argentine" military Attache. The "Argentine" reported on October 5 that Viaux wanted several hundred paralyzing gas grenades to launch a coup on October 9. (Santiago 476, 6 October) Headquarters turned down the request, concluding that a "mini-coup at this juncture would be counterproductive" and Viaux should postpone his plans, "while encouraging him in a suitable manner to maintain his posture so that he may join larger movement later if it materializes." (Headquarters 585, 6 October)

The primary purpose of the "False Flag Base" was to contact Viaux, and it very rapidly relieved Wimert and the "Argentine" Attache of that task. Viaux reiterated his demand for an air drop of weapons to the "False Flagger," and again the response was the same: reject the demand for arms, but encourage him to keep planning. In essence the Agency was buying time with Viaux: "We wish to encourage Viaux to expand and refine his coup planning. Gain some influence over his actions." (Headquarters 689, 10 October) To achieve this latter purpose, Headquarters authorized passing $20,000 in cash and a promise of $250,000 in life insurance to Viaux and his associates, as a demonstration of U.S. support. (Headquarters 729, 13 October)

On October 13, Headquarters again indicated its concern over Schneider by asking: "What is to keep Schneider from making statement in early hours which will freeze those military leaders who might otherwise join Viaux?" (Headquarters 729, 13 October) The Station's response later that same day was "Viaux intends to kidnap Generals Schneider and Prats within the next 48 hours in order to precipitate a coup." (Santiago 527,

13 October) This Viaux kidnapping of Schneider was reported by the Station "as part of a coup that included Valenzuela." (Station 529, 13 October)

At about this time the Station began to receive encouragement from its other contacts. On October 14, ten days before the Chilean Congress was to vote, the Task Force Log concluded:

> Now we are beginning to see signs of increasing coup activity from other military quarters, specifically, an Army General (name deleted), Admiral [redacted] the forces in Concepcion and Valdivis and perhaps even Frei and [redacted]
> (Task Force Log, 14 October)

C. October 15 Decision

To summarize, by October 15, General Viaux had advertised to his contact a desire to proceed with a coup, had indicated he would deal with the Schneider obstacle by kidnapping him, had met at least once with Generals [redacted] and Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup plans.*

On October 15 Thomas Karamessines met Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig at the White House to discuss the situation in Chile. According to the Agency's record of this meeting, Karamessines "provided a rundown on Viaux, the [redacted] meeting with [redacted], and, in some detail, the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." (Memorandum of Conversation/Kissinger, Karamessines, and Haig, 15 October 1970) A decision was made at the meeting "to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily:"

* The reason for Viaux postponing his coup plans was the subject of a cable from Santiago to Headquarters:

> We discount Viaux's statement that he had called off his coup attempt because of False Flag Officer's impending visit. Other reporting indicated Viaux probably not able or intending move this weekend. (Santiago 499, 10 October)

There is also reason to believe that General Valenzuela was instrumental in persuading Viaux to postpone. According to the Chile Task Force Log:

> Station reported that on 12 October General Valenzuela met with General Viaux and attempted to persuade him not to attempt a coup." (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October)

> It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence the message should state: "We have reviewed your plans and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities in the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support." (15 October Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger, Karamessines, Haig)

The meeting concluded, according to the Agency's record, "on Dr. Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply."*

The following day CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the White House meeting to the Station in Santiago:

> 2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup....We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource.
>
> 3. After the most careful consideration it was determined that a Viaux coup attempt carried out by him alone with the forces now at his disposal would fail. Thus it would be counterproductive to our Track Two objectives. It was decided that CIA get a message to Viaux warning him against precipitate action. (Headquarters 802, 16 October)

The message was supplemented by orders to "continue to encourage him (Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces with other coup planners." (Headquarters 802, 16 October) The message concluded: "There is great and continuing interest in the activities of [redacted] [redacted] Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune." (Ibid.)

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* Secretary Kissinger's recollection of the October 15 meeting is not in accord with that of Mr. Karamessines or the cable (Headquarters 802) that was sent the following day to the Station in Santiago. This matter will be discussed in Part V of this report.

D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15

The decision to "de-fuse" General Viaux was passed to Viaux's [redacted] on October 17. The [redacted] responded that it did not matter because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case. (Santiago 533, 17 October) At the final meeting of the CIA "False Flagger" and Viaux's [redacted] on October 18, the Agency was informed that the coup would proceed on October 22, "and that the abduction of General Schneider is first link in chain of events to come." (Santiago 568, 19 October) An "emergency channel" of communication with Viaux was maintained. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, page 21)

As previously stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked brighter for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean military contacts.*
As a CIA overview statement in Track II stated:

> Coup possibilities afforded by the active duty military group led by General Valenzuela and Admiral [redacted] had always seemed more promising than the capabilities of the Viaux group. These military officers had the ability and resources to act providing they decided to move and organized themselves accordingly.
> (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July 15, 1975, p. 5)

By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in this direction.

On the evening of October 17, Colonel Wimert met with the Army [redacted] and the Navy [redacted]. They requested 8 to 10 tear gas grenades,

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*Two coup plotters, Generals [redacted] and [redacted], made one last attempt to persuade General Schneider to change his anti-coup position on October 15. The Station reported that the meeting turned out to be a "complete fiasco. Schneider refused to listen to General [redacted]' eloquent presentation of Communist action in Chile...and adament in maintaining his non-involvement stance." (Santiago 548, 16 October)

three 45-caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition. The Navy [redacted] said he had three machine guns himself "but can be identified by serial numbers as having been issued to him. Therefore unable to use them." (Santiago 562, 18 October) (Colonel Wimert) and the Chief of Station have testified that the officers wanted the machine guns for self-protection. The question, of course, is whether the arms were intended for use, or were used, in the kidnapping of General Schneider. The fact that the weapons were provided the [redacted] and the Navy [redacted] and that Viaux associates were convicted of the Schneider killing suggests that the guns were not involved.

The machine guns and ammunition were sent from Washington by diplomatic pouch on the morning of October 19, although Headquarters was puzzled about their purpose: "Will continue make effort provide them but find our credulity stretched by Navy [redacted] leading his troops with sterile guns. What is special purpose for these guns? We will try send them whether you can provide explanation or not." (Headquarters 854, 18 October) The first installment was delivered to the Army [redacted] and the Navy [redacted] late in the evening of October 18 and consisted of the six tear gas grenades intended originally for Viaux.*

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* As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in Chile focussed on the active duty military officers--Valenzuela, et. al.--rather than Viaux. An example of this shift in focus was the decision to provide the Army [redacted] and the Army [redacted] the tear gas grenades originally intended for Viaux. A cable from Santiago explained the purpose of this action:

> Station plans give six tear gas grenades to (Colonel Wimert) for delivery to Armed Forces officers (deletion) instead of having (False Flag Officer) deliver them to Viaux group. Our reasoning is that (Wimert) dealing with active duty officers. Also (False Flagger) leaving evening 18 October, and will not be replaced but (Wimert) will stay here. Hence important that (Wimert) credibility with Armed Forces officers be strengthened.
>
> (Santiago 562, 18 October)

That same day, General Valenzuela informed Colonel Wimert that he, General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General were prepared to sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of General Schneider on the following evening, October 19, at a military dinner being given for Schneider,* after which Schneider would be flown to Argentina, Frei would resign and leave Chile, Admiral Tirado would head the military junta, and dissolve Congress. With respect to the kidnapping of Schneider, the cable reports:

> General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation but not directly involved. He has been sent to Vina to stay with prominent physician. Will be seen in public places during 19 and 20 October to demonstrate fact that above operation not his doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at end of week. Military will not admit involvement in Schneider's abduction which is to be blamed on leftists. (Santiago 566, 19 October)

The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General Schneider left in a private vehicle, rather than in his official car, and his police guard failed to be withdrawn, but the Army [redacted] assured Colonel Wimert that another attempt would be made on October 20. (Santiago 582, 20 October) Colonel Wimert was authorized to pay Valenzuela $50,000 "which was the price agreed upon between the plotters and the unidentified team of abductors."

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* The "False Flag Officer" who was in contact with Viaux at the time the Valenzuela plan was given to Colonel Wimert apparently understood that Viaux was involved in the October 19 attempt. He stated:

> Q. Were you told any of the details of how the (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out?
>
> Mr. Sarno. They indicated it was going to be at some sort of a banquet which the General (Schneider) would be attending.
>
> (Sarno testimony, p. 37)

but Wimert insisted that the kidnapping be completed before he paid the money. (Task Force Log, 20 October) At the same time General Valenzuela assured Colonel Wimert that the military was now prepared to move. (Task Force Log, 20 October) The second abduction attempt on the 20th also failed and the Task Force concluded

> Since Valenzuela's group is apparently having considerable difficulty executing even the first step of its coup plan, the prospects for a coup succeeding or even occurring before 24 October now appears remote. (Task Force Log, 22 October)

E. The Killing of General Schneider

In the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am), Colonel Wimert delivered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the Army [redacted] in an isolated section of Santiago.*

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*Although Colonel Wimert's testimony and the cable traffic do not clearly establish the identity of the group to which the [redacted] was affiliated (see page 31) two CIA statements on Track II tie the weapons, and therefore the [redacted] to the Valenzuela group:

> ...The only assistance requested by Valenzuela to set the plan /of October 19/ into motion through Schneider's abduction was several sub-machine guns, ammunition, a few tear gas grenades and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus $50,000 for expenses (which was to be passed upon demand.
> (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, p. 22)
>
> ...Three sub-machine guns, together with six gas cannisters and masks, were passed to the Valenzuela group at 2 am on 22 October. The reason why they still wanted the weapons was because there were two days remaining before the Congress decided the Presidential election and the Valenzuela group maintained some hope they could still carry out their plans.
> (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," p. 7, July 15, 1975)

At about 7 am that day the group that intended to kidnap General Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions. According to the findings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the Schneider killing, neither the Army [redacted] nor the Navy [redacted] were there. Shortly after 8 am, General Schneider's car was intercepted, on his way to work, by the abductors and he was mortally wounded when he drew his handgun in self-defense. The Military Court determined that hand guns had been used to kill General Schneider, although it also found that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the killing.*

The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said "Military Mission sources claim General Schneider machine gunned on way to work" (Santiago 587, 22 October) and "Assailants used grease guns." (Santiago 589, 22 October) The submachine guns had previously been described as "grease guns." Thus the initial reaction of the Station was that Schneider had been shot with the same kind of weapons delivered several hours earlier to the Army [redacted]. Santiago then informed Headquarters "Station has instructed Col. Wimert to hand over $50,000 if Gen. Valenzuela requests " (Santiago 592, 22 October), thus indicating that the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by Valenzuela's paid abductors. Later that day, the Station cabled Headquarters:

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* The Military Court determined that those who participated in the shooting of General Schneider on October 22 were part of the Viaux-led conspiracy. The Court also found that this same group had participated in the October 19 and 20 kidnap attempts.

In June 1972 General Viaux was convicted for complicity in the plot culminating in the death of General Schneider. He received a 20-year prison sentence for being "author of the crime of kidnapping which resulted in serious injury to the victim," and a five-year exile for conspiring to cause a military coup. Also convicted on the latter charge were Generals Valenzuela and [redacted]. They received sentences of three years in exile.

> Station unaware if assassination was premeditated or whether it constituted bungled abduction attempt. In any case, it important to bear in mind that move against Schneider was conceived by and executed at behest of senior Armed Forces officers. We know that General Valenzuela was involved. We also near certain that Admiral [redacted], Army [redacted] and Navy [redacted] witting and involved. We have reason for believeing that General Viaux and numerous associates fully clued in, but cannot prove or disprove that execution or attempt against Schneider was entrusted to elements linked with Viaux. Important factor to bear in mind is that Armed Forces, and not retired officers or extreme rightests, set Schneider up for execution or abduction.... All we can say is that attempt against Schneider is affording Armed Forces one last opportunity to prevent Allende's election if they are willing to follow Valenzuela's scenario.
>
> (Santiago 598, 22 October)

F. <u>Post October 22 Events</u>

The shooting of General Schneider resulted immediately in a declaration of martial law, the appointment of General Prats to succeed Schneider as Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General Valenzuela as chief of Santiago province. These measures, and others taken, caused the Chile Task Force to make the following initial judgment:

> With only 24 hours remaining before the Congressional runoff, a coup climate exists in Chile....The attack on General Schneider has produced developments which closely follow Valenzuela's plan....Consequently the plotters' positions have been enhanced.
>
> (Chile Task Force Log, 22 October)

On October 23, Director Helms reviewed and discussed Track II:

> It was agreed...that a maximum effort has been achieved, and that now only the Chileans themselves can manage a successful coup. The Chileans have been guided to a point where a military solution is at least open to them. (Task Force Log, 24 October)

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A. September

September 18

Helms and Karamessines met with Kissinger at the White House. As Helms' notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger wanted a plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the 18th, according to CIA records, there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather the conversation focused on "what economic leverage could be exercised in the Chilean situation...." (Memorandum/Meeting with DDP, 18 September)

The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a subject of concern during the last days of September. Apparently that pressure was viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei gambit."

September 21

The 40 Committee met. The Select Committee has no confirmation that Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines' calendar confirms that he attended; presumably Kissinger, the 40 Committee chairman, also attended, although the Committee has not been able to review his calendar. All that can be said about this meeting--and the meetings of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chaired--is that the meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger an opportunity to meet privately and discuss Track II if they desired. In all these instances save the 40 Committee meeting on September 22, the Committee has no evidence to confirm that such a private Kissinger/Karamessines meeting actually took place. That the CIA prepared a memorandum of conversation for the private meeting on the 22nd but has been able to find none for other meetings may provide some support for the argument that no other such private meetings occurred.

September 22

Kissinger asked Karamessines to stay behind after a 40 Committee meeting called to discuss Track I. The two men discussed Track II actions, (especially the contacts with then-Chilean-President Frei.) According to

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CIA records of the meeting, Kissinger told Karamessines that "our handling of the problem during the earlier meeting had been perfect and he added we were doing fine and keep it up." (Memorandum for the Record/Chile, 22 September 1970, by Thomas Karamessines)

B. October

October 5

A cable sent to Santiago, released by Karamessines, requested a report on how the Station planned to contact the three Chilean Generals --Prats, Valenzuela and [redacted]-named in a cable of September 30. (Headquarters 449) The October 5 cable indicated that the report was needed for a discussion with Kissinger on October 6. (Santiago 556, 5 October 1970) Karamessines presumed such a meeting had taken place, although he had no specific memory of it. (Karamessines testimony, pp. 69-70) His calendar for October 6 indicates that he attended a 40 Committee meeting on Chile. (Karamessines calendar) Kissinger chaired the 40 Committee.

October 6

The Station reported that General Viaux was "ready to launch golpe evening 9 October, or morning 10 October." (Santiago 472, 6 October 1970) In response, CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective coup one "with scant chance of success which will vitiate any further more serious action." The Station was directed to try to "stop ill-considered action at this time." (Headquarters 585, 6 October 1970)

Kissinger testified he had not been informed of the Viaux plan, supporting his recollection with the fact that the CIA memorandum of an October 10 conversation between Karamessines and Haig (see below) makes no mention of any previous plots. (Kissinger testimony, p. 24)

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> It seems to me, although the records don't reflect it, that there was a meeting in September, a very brief one, in which I must have been told that there was a specific program going underway. That probably would have been by Henry (Kissinger) and perhaps with Karamessines there. I am not sure. (Haig testimony, p. 12)

October 10

Karamessines discussed the Chilean situation by telephone with General Haig. He indicated that the Station had "made direct contact with a number of the senior military officers, especially those who had been reportedly very activist-minded and had received pessimistic reactions from all." (Memorandum/FUBELT, by William Broe, 10 October 1970) .02

Haig recalled the telephone conversation with Karamessines on the 10th. His recollection accords with the CIA memorandum of conversation.

> I do know, and I know that from looking at the record this morning, that Karamessines made a telephone call to me in which he gave a progress report. I recall that. It was in effect a negative progress report, that they were just not coming up with it. (Haig testimony, p. 12)

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Haig indicated to the Committee that he would have passed along the substance of that conversation to Kissinger, and that in general his role at the time was one of a conduit to Kissinger:

> I am quite confident that, given my own conception of my role at that time, that I would have conveyed that information to Henry,...
> (Haig testimony, p. 13)
> ***
>
> Q. If Mr. Karamessines was unable to see Dr. Kissinger, and talked to you, what degree of latitude did you have concerning what you would pass on to Dr. Kissinger?
>
> General Haig. At that time I would consider I had no degree of latitude, other than to convey to him what had been given to me. (Ibid., p. 15)

October 14

A cable to Santiago for Colonel Wimert, ostensibly from General Bennett, authorized Wimert to select two Chilean general officers and convey to them the following message: "High authority in Washington has authorized you to offer material support short of armed intervention to Chilean Armed Forces in any endeavors they may undertake to prevent the election of Allende on October 24...." (Headquarters to Station cable 762, October 14, 1970) Karamessines testified that in this case "high authority" would have been Kissinger or the President, for no one else could have given Wimert such broad authorization. Karamessines presumed that the message had been drafted in, or at least cleared with, the White House. (Karamessines testimony, p. 91)

However, Kissinger did not recall having authorized the October 14th cable. He found the sequence of events puzzling: having been told on the 10th that little was happening, he would have expected in the

October 15

Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to discuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines gave a run-down on Viaux, Canales and Tirado and "the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux did not have more than one chance in twenty--perhaps less--to launch a successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues:

> 5. It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence our message was to state: "We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support."
>
> 6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instructed Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile, working clandestinely and securely to maintain the capability for Agency operations against Allende in the future.
>
> 8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply.
> (Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15 October 1970)

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meeting on the 15th (see below) to have discussed the results of the October 14th message. But the CIA record makes no mention of any such discussion. (Kissinger testimony, p. 53)

October 14

The Senior Review Group met to discuss Chile. (Karamessines calendar)

October 15

Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to discuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines gave a run-down on Viaux, [redacted] and [redacted] and "the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux did not have more than one chance in twenty--perhaps less--to launch a successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues:

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> (Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15 October 1970)

Kissinger, in his testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA memorandum of conversation as substantially correct, although somewhat more detailed than he would have remembered. (Kissinger testimony, p. 52) He believed the Agency had been told to "stand down and preserve your assets."

Kissinger believed that the gist of the October 15th meeting as recorded in the CIA memorandum was incompatible with the order the CIA issued to its Station the next day, an order ostensibly based on the October 15th meeting. And, he noted, in writing its memorandum of the meeting of the 15th, the CIA had a "high incentive to preserve the maximum degree of authority." (Ibid., pp. 55-56) The October 16th order indicated that Track II had been reviewed at "high USG level" the previous day, and stated:

> 2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date....
>
> 4. There is great and continuing interest in the activities of [redacted], [redacted]) Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune.
>
> (Headquarters 802, 16 October 1970)

Kissinger recalled the October 15th conversation as "turning off the coup plans rather than giving a new order to do them." (Kissinger testimony, p. 56) Haig agreed in his testimony.

> The conclusions of that meeting were that we had better not do anything rather than something that was not going to succeed....My general feeling was, I left that meeting with the impression that there was nothing authorized."
>
> (Haig testimony, p. 13)

Lodge further warned that "the US must not appear publicly in the matter, thus giving the 'kiss of death' to its friends" (Cable, Lodge to Harriman, 8/26/63).

In a cable on August 25, CIA Chief of Station John Richardson reported the result of a conference among himself, Lodge, Trueheart, General Harkins (Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and General Weede (Chief of Staff, MACV). They accepted Deptel 243 "as a basic decision from Washington and would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions", (I.G., C, pp. 7-8) but believed that Diem would refuse to remove his brother from his position in the government.

Early in the morning of August 26, 1963, the Voice of America in South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids and absolved the army. The broadcast also reported speculation that the United States contemplated suspending aid to the South Vietnamese Government (Pentagon Papers, p. 212).* Later on that same day, Lodge presented his credentials to Diem. CIA officers Conein and Spera were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh, respectively, and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243, but to remind them that "we cannot be of any help during initial action of assuming power of state. Entirely their own action, win or lose" (SAIG 0304, 8/26/63).

A message from the White House on August 29 authorized Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese Generals that the United States would support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding, but did not involve United States armed forces. Lodge was authorized to suspend United States aid at his discretion. (Deptel 272, 8/29/63.) A cable from the President to Lodge on the same day stated:

*In a cable to Harriman, Lodge complained that the VOA broadcast had "complicated our already difficult problem" by eliminating "the possibility of the generals' effort achieving surprise." Lodge further warned that "the US must not appear publicly in the matter, thus giving the 'kiss of death' to its friends" (Cable, Lodge to Harriman, 8/26/63).

against a coup, but suggested that alternative leadership should be identified and cultivated. The recommendations were promptly approved by the President. (Pentagon Papers, pp.215-116)

On October 3 Conein contacted Minh. Minh explained that a coup was being planned, and requested assurances of American support if it were successful. Minh outlined three courses of action, one of which was the assassination of Diem's brothers, Nhu and Can (Conein, p.25; cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).* The Acting Chief of the CIA Station, [redacted] cabled on October 5 that he had recommended to Lodge that "we do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a protracted struggle" (Cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).

A cable from the Director, CIA to Saigon responded that:

> "(w)e certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination, but on the other hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every such threat of which we might receive even partial knowledge. We certainly would not favor assassination of Diem. We believe engaging ourselves by taking position on this matter opens door too easily for probes of our position re others, re support of regime, et cetera. Consequently believe best approach is hands off. However, we naturally interested in intelligence on any such plan."**

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* The other courses of action were the encirclement of Saigon by various military units and direct confrontation between military units involved in the coup and loyalist units.

** Colby, who was then Chief, Far Eastern Division, drafted this cable for McCone. Colby testified:

> "Q: So you were on notice as of that date that the Director personally opposed any involvement by the CIA in an assassination?
>
> "Colby: I certainly was." (Colby, p. 57)

McCone testified that he met privately with the President and the Attorney General, taking the position that "our role was to assemble all information on intelligence as to what was going on and to report it to the appropriate authorities, but to not attempt to direct it" (McCone, p. 62). He believed the United States should maintain a "hands off attitude" (McCone, p. 62). McCone testified:

> "I felt that the President agreed with my position, despite the fact that he had great reservations concerning Diem and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to encourage more support throughout the country. My precise words to the President, and I remember them very clearly, was that Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether he was a good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that, if Diem was removed we would have not one coup but we would have a succession of coups and political disorder in Vietnam and it might last several years and indeed it did." (McCone, pp. 62-63.)

McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with the President, but rather "whether we should let the coup go or use our influences not to". He left the meeting believing that the President agreed with his "hands off" recommendation (McCone, pp. 62-63). McCone cabled [redacted] on October 6:

> "McCone directs that you withdraw recommendation to ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under McCone instructions, as we cannot be in position actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefore" (CIA to Saigon, DIR 73661, 10/6/63).

In response, the CIA Station in Saigon cabled headquarters:

> "Action taken as directed. In addition, since DCM Trueheart was also present when original recommendation was made, specific withdrawal of recommendation at McCone's instruction was also conveyed to Trueheart. Ambassador Lodge commented that he shares McCone's opinion." (Saigon to CIA, SAIC 1463, 10/7/63)

None of the informed sources give any indication of direct or indirect involvement of the United States.*

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* It must be noted that on October 30, 1963, Ambassador Lodge notified Washington that there might be a request by ked leaders for evacuation, and suggested Saipan as a point for evacuation (Saigon Station Cable No. 2036, 10/30/63). Conein was charged with obraining the airplane. Between 6:00 and 7:00 on the morning of November 2, Minh and Don asked Conein to procure an aircraft. Conein relayed the request to [redacted], Acting Chief of Station at the Embassy, who replied that it would not be possible to get an aircraft for the next twenty-four hours, since it would have to be flown from Guam. Conein testified that Smith told him that Diem could be flown only to a country that offered him asylum and that the plane could not land in any other country. There were no aircraft immediately available that had sufficient range to reach a potential country of asylum (Conein, p. 54).

United States "as [a] matter of general policy cannot condone assassination", although he did state that if the coup succeeded, the United States would support the plotters.

d. Lumumba

The chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the assassination plot was authorized by the President. It is absolutely clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot.

The juxtaposition of discussions concerning "disposing of" Lumumba and taking "straightforward action" against him at NSC and Special Group meetings with Dulles' cable to the Congo, Bissell's representation to Gottlieb about "highest authority", and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support an inference that the President and the Special Group urged the assassination of Lumumba.

Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President to have ordered Lumumba's assassination at an NSC meeting does, as he said, offer a "clue" about Presidential authorization which, however, should be read in light of the uncertain record of the meetings Johnson attended and the contrary testimony of others in attendance at the meetings, including the President's national security advisors. The fact that both the Chief of Station and Gottlieb were under the impression that there was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba is not in itself direct evidence of such authorization because

this impression was derived solely from Gottlieb's meetings with Bissell and Tweedy. Neither Gottlieb nor the Chief of Station had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles' statements about Presidential authorization. Richard Bissell assumed that such authorization had been conveyed to him by Dulles, but Bissell had no specific recollection of any event when this occurred.

The evidence leads us to conclude that DDP Bissell and DCI Dulles knew about and authorized the plot to assassinate Lumumba. However, we are unable to make a finding that President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination effort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute certainty in the evidence.

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First, it assumes that Dulles himself knew of the plots, a matter which is not certain. Second, it assumes that Dulles went privately to the two Presidents--a course of action which Helms, who had far more covert action experience than Bissell, testified was precisely what the doctrine of plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing. Third, it necessarily assumes that the Presidents would understand from a "circumlocutious" description that assassination was being discussed.

The chain of assumptions is far too speculative for the Committee to make findings inplicating Presidents who are not able to speak for themselves. Moreover, it is inconsistent with Bissell's other testimony that "formal and explicit" approval would be required for assassination,* and contrary to the testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy.

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* If the evidence concerning President Eisenhower's order to assassinate Lumumba is correct, it should be weighed against Bissell's testimony concerning circumlocutious briefings of the Presidents in the Castro case. First, the Lumumba case would imply that President Eisenhower and Dulles did discuss such matters bluntly and not circumlocutiously. Second, the Lumumba example indicates that the President would discuss such matters openly in an appropriate forum, and would not need to be approached privately. Third, it can be inferred from Bissell's testimony in the Castro case that if President Eisenhower had told Dulles that he approved of the plot, Dulles would not have told anyone else of that fact. Yet Gottlieb's testimony in the Lumumba case states that he had been told of Presidential authorization for assassination by Bissell, who in turn assumed he was told by Dulles.